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Lawyers commonly associate with nonlawyers to assist in their performance of
lawyering tasks. A lawyer cannot know with confidence, though, whether the
delegation of some tasks to a nonlawyer colleague might result in her assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, because the state of the law and the commentary about
nonlawyer practice is so confused and incoherent. Some respected authority within the
profession tells the lawyer that she may only delegate preparatory matters and must
prohibit the nonlawyer from discussing legal matters with clients, or negotiating on
behalf of clients. Other authority suggests that the lawyer may delegate a wide array
of tasks as long as the lawyer supervises the work of the nonlawyer and accepts
responsibility for it. A good-faith lawyer reviewing the available commentary would
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find it difficult to achieve appropriate comfort with her delegation decisions. This
uncertainty affects not only lawyers working with paralegals and law clerks, butfirms
hiring out of state lateral associates and partners, and law school clinical programs
engaged in transactional work.
This Article articulates aframeworkfor assessing delegation choices, aframework
which seeks to be both coherent and sensible. The framework relies on insights about
lawyeringjudgment and risk assessment, client informed consent, and unauthorized-
practice-of-law prophylaxis. Any delegation of work by a lawyer to a nonlawyer
involves an exercise of the lawyer's judgment about an appropriate balance of risk
and efficiency, along with an eye toward the client's informed choice about how to
achieve the goals of the representation most efficiently. The prevailing unauthorized-
practice-of-law dogma prevents a client from seeking the most economical
representation by only retaining a nonlawyer, but that dogma trusts lawyers to protect
a client's interests. With those considerations in place, this Article shows that the
profession cannot, and in fact does not, deny the lawyer any categorical options in
making delegation choices, except for those involving court appearances. Aside from
sending a nonlawyer to court or to court-connected proceedings, a lawyer may
responsibly delegate any of her lawyering activities to a nonlawyer associate, subject
to the prevailing conceptions of competent representation and to the lawyer's
retaining ultimate responsibility for the resulting work product and performance.
Some commentary and some court opinions suggest a different answer to the
questions addressed here, but those authorities do not withstand careful analysis. This
Article shows that a more careful reading of the commentary and the court dicta
supports the framework and the thesis offered here. Nonlawyers may not
independently engage in activity that equates to the practice of law, if by
"independently" we mean without supervision and oversight from a lawyer. That
important and uncontroversial limitation, however, is the only categorical restriction
on a lawyer's discretion. A supervised nonlawyer may play a much more active and
important role in a lawyer's overall representation of her client than many have
claimed. For the client, that is a very good result.
INTRODUCTION
This Article explores an aspect of contemporary legal practice that is the source of
considerable confusion within the profession-the limits, if any, on the engagement in
legal activity by nonlawyers employed by lawyers. Most of the rhetoric from
commentators and bar associations warns lawyers that they categorically may not
delegate certain activities to their nonlawyer colleagues, especially the communication
of legal advice) Other authoritative sources, however, declare that lawyers may
lawfully exercise considerable discretion about how nonlawyers work, so long as the
lawyer supervises the work.2 The available substantive law on the topic is scarce and
1. See, e.g., MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE UTILIZATION OF PARALEGAL SERVS. Guideline
3(C) (2004) (declaring that paralegals may not provide legal advice to clients); see also infra
text accompanying notes 40-97, for a discussion of that restriction and other categorical limits.
2. See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 2 (2009) ("[The rules do] not
prohibit a lawyer from employing the services of paraprofessionals and delegating functions to
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not entirely coherent. This Article represents an effort to accomplish dual objectives-
to understand the available substantive law and its lessons about delegation of work to
nonlawyers, and to craft a coherent framework for addressing the topic to guide
lawyers and law firms in their practices. To those ends, this Article proposes a
workable and practical thesis about nonlawyer practice that is faithful to the spirit of
the principles governing how lawyers work.
Nonlawyers, of course, may not practice law in any jurisdiction within the United
States,3 subject to some limited exceptions not relevant here.4 Established common law
and state statutes throughout the United States limit the practice of law to members of
the bar within the jurisdiction where the legal activity takes place.5 While the
them, so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and retains responsibility for their
work."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 (2002) (permitting lawyer
discretion without categorical exclusions). For a discussion of the discretionary authorities, see
infra text accompanying notes 40-61.
3. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a) (2009); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 (2002); DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 15 (2004);
Prohibitions on Practice of Nonlawyers, Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABAiBNA) No. 210, at
21:8001 (Dec. 22, 1999) ("Every jurisdiction prohibits the unauthorized practice of law.").
4. The exceptions include legal work on matters whose practice is preempted by federal
law, such as patent and tax work, see 37 C.F.R. § 10.14 (2009); 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2009)
(governing practice before the Internal Revenue Service); Ted Schneyer, An Interpretation of
Recent Developments in the Regulation of Law Practice, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 559,570-71
(2005) (discussing both contexts); appearances before certain administrative agencies, see Alex
J. Hurder, Nonlawyer LegalAssistance andAccess to Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2241, 2273
(1999) ("Many federal agencies, including the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Department of Labor, and the Social
Security Administration, permit nonlawyers to appear in cases before them." (citations
omitted)); Marlene M. Remmert, Note, Representation of Clients Before Administrative
Agencies: Authorized or Unauthorized Practice of Law?, 15 VAL. U. L. REv. 567,577 (1981);
and certain other legislative allowances, see, e.g., Kathleen Eleanor Justice, Note, There Goes
the Monopoly: The California Proposal to Allow Nonlawyers to Practice Law, 44 VAND. L.
REv. 179, 206-07 (1991). For an overview of the unauthorized-practice rules and exceptions,
see generally 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 5.5:201 (3d ed. 2001 & Supp.
2009); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 15.1, at 824-49 (1986).
5. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6125 (West 2003) ("No person shall practice law
in California unless the person is an active member of the State Bar."); LAS Collection
Management v. Pagan, 858 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Mass. 2006) ("Plainly the commencement and
prosecution for another of legal proceedings in court, and the advocacy for another of a cause
before a court... are reserved exclusively for members of the bar." (quoting Lowell Bar Ass'n
v. Loeb, 52 N.E.2d 27, 32-33 (Mass. 1943))). For an overview of the policy and ethics debates
about the unauthorized practice of law, see, for example, DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LuBAN,
LEGAL ETHICS 800-10 (5th ed. 2009); Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to
Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 531, 567 (1994); Derek A. Denckla, Response,
Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical
Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2581, 2597 (1999); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the
Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice
Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1981) [hereinafter Rhode, Policing the Professional
Monopoly]. For a historical perspective, see Michael S. Ariens, American Legal Ethics in an
Age ofAnxiety, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 343 (2008).
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"unauthorized-practice-of-law" dogma6 has many persuasive critics, 7 its central
premise is an essential conceit within the legal profession in this country-that only
lawyers, defined as individuals licensed to practice in the jurisdiction, may provide
legal services to clients. That otherwise stringent and unyielding dogma, though, has
historically allowed nonlawyers to assist lawyers in their provision of legal services, so
long as a lawyer supervises that assistance.8 The question we explore here is whether
there are forms of assistance that the lawyer may not delegate to a nonlawyer-that is,
whether there are tasks that the nonlawyer may not perform even under a lawyer's
supervision. This examination accepts, in a pragmatic way for the purposes of this
Article, the inevitability and the persistence of the unauthoized-practice-of-law
dogma.9
The intriguing questions about the scope of activity permitted to nonlawyers in law
firms arise in several practice contexts. 1 The inquiry obviously matters to the typical
6. In this Article I refer to the collection of unauthorized-practice-of-law mandates as a
"dogma." My choice of term represents my effort to capture the inflexibility and, at times,
unprincipled stubbornness of the arguments underlying the restrictions on nonlawyer practice.
See Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective: Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer
Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 701, 703, 711-12 (1996) [hereinafter Rhode,
Professionalism] (explaining that the unauthorized-practice rules promote a monopoly of legal
practice for licensed attorneys, which reduces availability of affordable legal services).
7. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 3, at 88-89 (noting that the Justice Department, the
Federal Trade Commission, and the ABA's antitrust division have opposed the ABA's proposal
to strengthen enforcement efforts against nonlawyers who practice law); Peter S. Margulies,
Protecting the Public Without Protectionism: Access, Competence and Pro Hac Vice Admission
to the Practice of Law, 7 ROGER WiLLiAMS U. L. REv. 285, 285 (2002) (noting that
unauthorized-practice-of-law restrictions "impair client access to attorneys of their choice").
8. See In re Opinion No. 24 of Comm. on Unauthorized Practice of Law, 607 A.2d 962,
967 (N.J. 1992) (acknowledging the importance of nonlawyer assistance to lawyers); MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2004).
9. In other words, this Article is not an inquiry into whether nonlawyers should be
permitted greater opportunities to practice law independently. That topic is well rehearsed
elsewhere. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 3, at 79-96; George C. Leef, The Case for a Free
Market in Legal Services, 322 POL'Y ANALYsIs 1 (1998); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers,
Non-Lawyers and Mediation: Rethinking the Professional Monopoly from a Problem-Solving
Perspective, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 235 (2002). The goal of this Article is to test the limits of
nonlawyer practice in light of, and respecting, existing unauthorized-practice restrictions.
10. One context that this Article will not address, despite its apparent connection to this
project, is the status of suspended or disbarred lawyers working as clerks, paralegals, or
assistants within law firms. While one might expect that the analyses and critiques developed in
this Article would apply naturally to those persons, in fact the jurisprudence sometimes treats
those individuals more strictly than other nonlawyers. See, e.g., Crawford v. State Bar, 355 P.2d
490 (Cal. 1960); In re Discipio, 645 N.E.2d 906, 911 (111. 1994) ("Without a doubt, a disbarred
or suspended attorney should not serve as a law clerk or a paralegal during his disbarment or
suspension."). But see, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Thomson, 310 So. 2d 300, 301 (Fla. 1975) (holding that
a disbarred attorney may be employed in a nonlawyer capacity under the supervision of a lawyer
in good standing). For an example of a state professional conduct rule limiting the rights of
disbarred or suspended lawyers, see N.M. R. ANN. R. 16-505 (West 2007). See also NFPA
Takes Stand on Disbarred, Suspended Attorneys, No. 5 LEGAL MGMT. (NFPA), Sept.-Oct.
2001, at 16 (reporting a National Federation of Paralegal Associations (NFPA) resolution
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law firm, whether a solo practice or a major international organization, where
paralegals regularly assist in preparation for every imaginable type of legal work-
complex commercial transactions, real estate closings, divorce settlements, pretrial
litigation and trial preparation, and the like. Lawyers in those settings should
understand the kinds of limits that exist on their use of nonlawyer assistants in their
practices.1
The question also arises in a more defined and perhaps interesting way in the setting
of a large, national law firm that hires lateral partners and associates from law firms in
other states.12 In lateral hiring settings, the new lawyer, who may be exquisitely
experienced and valuable as a member of the new firm (and who will likely be offered
a handsome salary to join the new firm), remains a nonlawyer until she passes the new
state's bar examination or otherwise gains admission into that state's bar.13 The new
law firm must understand the limits of the lateral's authority to offer her valuable and
highly compensated services to the firm's clients. If the law firm guesses wrong about
the contours of the lateral's role, it risks serious consequences.14 For a lateral who is a
litigator, avenues exist through which to obtain formal permission to practice law in the
asserting that "it is unethical for attorneys whose licenses have been revoked or who are under
suspension to gain employment and perform legal tasks handled by paralegals").
11. As the discussion below will highlight, trade associations have developed some
standards to which lawyers and paralegals may look for guidance. This Article critiques those
standards in its effort to reconcile some of the inconsistent messages arising from the guides.
The most prominent guides include those of the ABA and the National Association of Legal
Assistants (NALA). See MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE UTILIZATION OF PARALEGAL SERVICES
(2004); NAT'L ASS'N OF LEGAL ASSISTANTS, NALA CODE OF ETHICS AND PROESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, available at http://www.nala.org/code.aspx [hereinafter NALA CODE OF
ETHICS]; NAT'L Ass'N OF LEGAL ASSISTANTS, NALA MANUAL FOR PARALEGALS AND LEGAL
ASSISTANTS § 3.061 (5th ed. 2009).
12. Lateral movement among lawyers is a growing phenomenon. See Aric Press, In-House,
AM. LAW., Feb., 2009, at 11 ("A record number of Am Law 100 and 200 partners changed firms
last year ... [according to] our annual report."). For a discussion of the migrating-lawyer
phenomenon and the conflict-of-interest implications of that reality, see Paul R. Tremblay,
Migrating Lawyers and the Ethics of Conflict Checking, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489 (2006).
13. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM'RS & AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION ON LEGAL EDUC. &
ADMISSION TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 28-29
(2009). A lawyer may not simplyjoin a new state's bar at will upon changing residence. See id.
(explaining that 24 jurisdictions allowed lawyers admitted in another state to practice in the
courts of their state; each requires the state from which the attorney is licensed to allow similar
reciprocity to attorneys from their state); Andrew M. Perlman, A Bar Against Competition: The
Unconstitutionality ofAdmission Rules for Out-of-State Lawyers, 18 GEO. J. LEGALETHICS 135,
137-38 (2004) (critiquing those restrictions).
14. See, e.g., Birbrower v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 1-6 (Cal. 1998) (discussing a firm
that violated a state unauthorized-practice-of-law statute while serving a California client by
using attorneys in negotiation settlements and preliminary arbitration arrangements who were
not licensed to practice in California). For a review of Birbrower, its implications, and the ABA
response to the case, see generally, William T. Barker, Extrajurisdictional Practice byLawyers,
56 Bus. LAW 1501 (2001); Cynthia L. Fountaine, Have License, Will Travel: An Analysis of the
New ABA Multifurisdictional Practice Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 737, 740-41 (2003); H.
Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Federalism and Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal Ethics, 81
MINN. L. REV. 73, 82-83 (1997).
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new state on discrete matters.15 If the new lateral is a transactional lawyer, however, the
uncertainties addressed here are palpable and trigger serious professional responsibility
questions.
The recognition that this question has more importance within corporate and
transactional practice than in litigation practice suggests yet another setting where the
resolution of the questions addressed here has great importance. In recent years, law
schools have begun to offer clinical courses in which law students, for credit, engage in
the representation of small businesses and nonprofit corporations under the supervision
of a faculty member.' 6 In these clinics, students are expected to assume the role of a
practicing lawyer with much, and sometimes almost complete, responsibility for the
client's representation. That role assumption, indeed, is central to the clinical
pedagogical model.'7 In traditional litigation clinics, students may assume that lawyer
role without running afoul of unauthorized-practice principles by virtue of a student-
practice rule in effect in the state where the law school sits. 8 But the student-practice
rules of nearly all states are silent about students' practice in transactional settings.
19
Without a student-practice rule in place, students who wish to represent clients in a
transactional clinic are effectively nonlawyers. Faculty and students in such clinics
therefore must understand confidently the limits of that nonlawyer role.2°
15. Lawyers may appear in court with permission of a judge under a procedure known as
"pro hac vice." For a discussion of the pro hac vice accommodation, see infra note 26.
16. For a description of the emerging clinical movement in transactional and community
development work, see Alicia Alvarez, Community Development Clinics: What Does Poverty
Have to Do with Them?, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1269 (2007); Susan R. Jones, Promoting Social
and Economic Justice Through Interdisciplinary Work in Transactional Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL'Y 249 (2004); Susan R. Jones, Small Business and Community Economic Development:
Transactional Lawyering for Social Change and Economic Justice, 4 CLINICAL L. REv. 195
(1997) [hereinafter Jones, Transactional Lawyeringfor Social Change]; Shauna I. Marshall,
Mission Impossible?: Ethical Community Lawyering, 7 CLINICAL L. REv. 147 (2000); Peter
Pitegoff, Law School Initiatives in Housing and Community Development, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
275 (1995).
17. See, e.g., Russell Engler, The MacCrate Report Turns 10: Assessing Its Impact and
Identifying Gaps We Should Seek to Narrow, 8 CLINIcAL L. REv. 109, 169 (2001); Jennifer A.
Gundlach, "This Is a Courtroom, Not a Classroom ": So What Is the Role of the Clinical
Supervisor?, 13 CLINICAL L. REv. 279 (2006); Peter A. Joy, The Ethics of Law School Clinic
Students as Student-Lawyers, 45 S. TEX. L. REv. 815 (2004); James E. Molitemo, In-House
Live-Client Clinical Programs: Some Ethical Issues, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2377 (1999).
18. Every state has a student-practice rule outlining the requirements under which students
may perform lawyering tasks. See David F. Chavkin, Am IMy Client's Lawyer?: Role Definition
and the Clinical Supervisor, 51 SMU L. REv. 1507, 1546-54 (1998) (cataloguing student
practice rules from all states); cf infra note 36 and accompanying text.
19. As discussed below, student-practice rules are nearly uniform in addressing only.in-
court representation and other litigation contexts; they are mostly silent on the possibilities of
students performing work outside of the litigation setting. See Sara B. Lewis, Comment, Rite of
Professional Passage: A Case for the Liberalization of Student Practice Rules, 82 MARQ. L.
REv. 205, 207-09 (1998) (addressing inadequacies in current student-practice rules and
proposing a better mode of regulation for students in clinical settings); see also infra text
accompanying notes 36, 199.
20. Another increasingly important context in which these questions have direct relevance
is that involving the use of foreign lawyers as adjuncts to United States law firm practice. For a
[Vol. 85:653
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This Article will refer to all of those actors as nonlawyers, rather than referring to
them in the more narrow conception of paralegals. 21 While all paralegals are
nonlawyers, many nonlawyers, like lateral soon-to-be partners 22 and associates or law
students engaged in transactional work in a clinic, differ in important ways from the
usual understanding of paralegals. I use a broader term for a substantive reason as well.
The thesis developed here is a unified one, applicable to all nonlawyers regardless of
their status within a law firm, while by its terms accounting for the difference in skill
and experience of the nonlawyers to whom a lawyer has delegated some legal
responsibility.
The thesis that this Article will defend emerges from an appreciation of three
features central to effective practice as understood by the prevailing law and ethics of
lawyering. First, it recognizes the importance of the lawyer's professional practical
judgment and risk assessment in accomplishing legal work for a client.23 Second, the
thesis acknowledges the relationship between the lawyer's pragmatic judgments and
the client's informed consent.24 And finally, it builds upon the reality of, and the
rationales underlying, the unauthorized-practice-of-law prophylaxis.25
Those features understood in concert permit the following thesis to emerge: A
lawyer may delegate to a nonlawyer working in her law firm any lawyering task, except
for appearaaces before tribunals such as courts (or activities ancillary to such
appearances, such as depositions), so long as the lawyer adequately supervises the
nonlawyer and accepts full professional responsibility for the resulting work. The
lawyer's delegation decisions remain subject to the competence and malpractice
standards generally applicable to lawyering, as well as to the informed buy-in of the
lawyer's client.
This thesis does not accommodate categorical, preemptive rules limiting a lawyer's
delegation choices, except in two ways. It accepts the pragmatic categorical limitations
on nonlawyer involvement in the work of tribunals, acknowledging the practical
operation of courts and judges.26 It also recognizes the historical restrictions involving
discussion of that phenomenon, see Richard Abel, Transnational Law Practice, 44 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 737, 750-62 (1994); Michele Gilligan, Another Effect of Globalization: Role of
Foreign Educated Lawyers in Maryland Legal Practice, 37 U. BALT. L.F. 1, 12 (2006); Darya
V. Pollak, "I'm Calling My Lawyer... in India!": Ethical Issues in International Legal
Outsourcing, 11 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 99 (2006); Carole Silver, The Case of the
Foreign Lawyer: Internationalizing the US. Legal Profession, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1039
(2002).
21. The Model Rules use the term "nonlawyer." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3
(2009). The ABA standards use the term "paralegals." MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE UTILIZATION
OF PARALEGAL SERVS. (2004).
22. Nonlawyers may not be equity partners in law firms in most jurisdictions. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2004). But see N. Y. JuDICIARY LAw DR 2-102(D) (2003)
(explaining that out-of-state lawyers may be partners in New York law firms under certain
circumstances).
23. See infra Part III.B.1.
24. See infra Part III.B.2.
25. See infra Part III.B.3.
26. Out-of-state lawyers typically may appear in courts with the permission of the presiding
judge under a scheme known as "pro hac vice." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 3 cmt. e (2002) (describing the practice); see also Margulies, supra note
7, at 303-07 (describing the pro hac vice process); cf Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979)
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the management and ownership of law firms.27 The thesis is fully consistent with a
nuanced appreciation of the available substantive law, although it is arguably
inconsistent in some important ways with much advisory pronouncement on the topic,
As will be discussed,28 one significant categorical topic muddies the thesis-the oft-
repeated advisory prohibition against nonlawyers giving legal advice to a client.29 That
prohibition, upon reflection and careful review of the available substantive law, is
neither sustainable nor coherent. While nonlawyers cannot, in light of the
unauthorized-practice dogma, offer independent advice or counsel to a client, they may
properly communicate supervised legal advice in collaboration with the lawyer
responsible for the matter.
30
This Article will explore these issues in the following way. It begins in Part I with a
story, populated by a lawyer practicing in a law firm with several nonlawyers available
to assist him. My intention is to use the story to highlight the various ways in which
nonlawyers of differing experience and training might assist in contributing to the
resolution of a client's legal matter. Part II summarizes the substantive law and
advisory authority available to an observer looking for guidance on the questions posed
here. Part II concludes that binding common law, rules, or statutes do not support the
advisory authority's insistence that certain categorical activity is off limits for
nonlawyers.
Part III develops the thesis just articulated. It describes the three features central to
a thoughtful assessment of nonlawyer participation-lawyering judgment, client
autonomy, and unauthorized-practice rationales. It then unpacks the justifications for
the profession's acceptance of nonlawyer assistance in the "easy" instances (drafting
documents, performing legal research, and investigating facts), and proceeds to show
(explaining that there is no constitutional right to gain pro hac vice admission). The court-
appearance exception is not a principled one but instead a pragmatic one, recognizing the reality
of American litigation practice. It is also noncontroversial, both because of its public character
(a judge has control over his or her court and can decide definitively who may say what words
or take what actions in the courtroom) and because in that sphere lawyers do not struggle with
the uncertainties that they encounter in their out-of-court or in-office practices. See Steven
Stewart Madsen, Comment, Leis v. Flynt: Retaining a Nonresident Attorneyfor Litigation, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 572, 584-87 (1979).
27. The legal profession closely protects its exclusive ownership and management of law
practice. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (2004) (lawyers may not share fees
with nonlawyers); id. at 5.4(b) (no partnership with nonlawyers); id. at 5.4(d) (no nonlawyer
ownership in law firms); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 10 (2002).
For a sampling of the critique of that protectionist stance (which this Article will not challenge
for its purposes), see Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of
Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 217 (2000); Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic
Cost of Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2008);
Charles W. Wolfram, The ABA and MDPs: Context, History, and Process, 84 MINN. L. REV.
1625 (2000).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 50-57.
29. See, e.g., VA. ALLIANCE OF PARALEGAL ASS'NS (VAPA), EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR PARALEGALS IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF
VIRGINIA Guideline 1 cmt. (1995), http://www.vaparalegalalliance.org/educational.html
[hereinafter VAPA GUIDELINES] ("A paralegal shall not give legal advice or opinions ... .
30. See infra text accompanying notes 147-48.
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how those justifications presume a lawyer's exercise ofjudgment about risk and benefit
in her fiduciary role on her client's behalf. Once unpacked, the risk assessment and
lawyering judgment factors operate to support the thesis that there are, or ought to be,
no categorical exceptions to a lawyer's delegation discretion. Part IV then returns to
the law firm story, to show how the thesis might operate in context.
I. A LAW FIRM STORY
Any analysis of the limits of nonlawyer practice within a law firm would benefit
from some concrete context. Let us, then, imagine the following story:
31
Essex Legal Services Institute (ELSI) is a state- and foundation-funded legal aid
organization offering free legal services to low- and moderate-income persons within
Essex County, Massachusetts. 32 ELSI has traditionally offered individual litigation
services-family law, housing and eviction defense, Social Security disability appeals,
and the like-to its individual clients, in addition to performing impact litigation on
behalf of groups of poor clients.33 ELSI recently hired Dara Coletta, a community
economic development lawyer with four years experience in California, to join its
program to establish a new community economic development (CED) project, which
will offer representation of nonprofits and community-based organizations in an effort
to contribute to the asset building of its constituents. 34 Coletta has applied to take the
31. The story chosen here emerges from public interest practice, even though an equally
useful story would use a private law firm setting. I have chosen a legal services organization,
though, for a very direct purpose. As the story indicates, it permits the comparison of an
experienced lateral lawyer, a certified law student, a noncertified law student, and a novice
paralegal intern, to test whether the qualifications and experience of the legal
assistant/nonlawyer make a difference in the analysis. Since private law firms typically cannot
use certified law students (as most student-practice rules limit student representation to clinical
or nonprofit settings), the public interest setting offers a better opportunity for comparison. Of
course, the assessments of the limits on the unauthorized-practice dogma arising in this setting
should be fully transferable to the private firm setting.
32. ELSI is entirely fictional, although Essex County, Massachusetts is not. ELSI has
appeared before. Paul R. Tremblay, Acting "a Very Moral Type of God": Triage Among Poor
Clients, 67 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2475, 2483 (1999).
33. Neighborhood legal services offices have traditionally focused on crisis-driven,
litigation-centric services for the poor clients in their communities. For an assessment of the role
tensions of such offices, see Marshall J. Breger, Legal Aidfor the Poor: A ConceptualAnalysis,
60 N.C. L. REv. 281 (1982); Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor, 83
GEO. L.J. 1529, 1536-39 (1995); Peter Margulies, Political Lawyering, One Person at a Time:
The Challenge of Legal Work Against Domestic Violence for the Impact Litigation/Client
Service Debate, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 493, 497, 502 (1996).
34. Poverty lawyers have an increasing interest in community economic development,
rather than the traditional litigation services, as an essential part of community empowerment.
See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNrIy ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOvEMENT: LAW, BusINEss
AND THE NEW SoCIAL POLICY (2001); Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development
as Progressive Politics: Towards a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L.
REv. 399 (2001); Scott L. Cummings, Developing Cooperatives as a Job Creation Strategy for
Low-Income Workers, 25 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 181 (1999); Jones, Transactional
Lawyering for Social Change, supra note 16; Marshall, supra note 16.
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Massachusetts Bar Exam, and with luck she will be a Massachusetts lawyer within nine
months. Her supervisor at ELSI is Joe Bartholomew, a twenty-two-year veteran of
Massachusetts legal services practice, but a relative newcomer to the transactional
issues that the new CED project will encounter.
One of the CED project's first new clients is the Montrose Community
Development Corporation (MCDC), which is in the midst of developing thirty-three
units of below-market condominium housing for sale to low- and moderate-income,
first-time home buyers. Coletta agreed with MCDC for ELSI to serve as its counsel in
the final development stages, and then in the sale transactions, from the purchase and
sale agreements through the final closings to qualified families. Because the
condominium development includes deed restrictions (to maintain the affordability of
the units over time), the MCDC documents will include special master covenants and
other sophisticated tools to achieve the project's mission. 35
ELSI assigned three part-time staff members to work with Bartholomew and Coletta
on the MCDC project:
" David Dahlstrom is a third-year law student who had been working in ELSI's
Housing Unit, defending evictions in court. Dahlstrom has obtained the status
of "certified law student" under the Massachusetts Student Practice Rule.
36
" Julie Lucia is a second-year law student who had been working in ELSI's
Welfare Unit, preparing and attending welfare hearings. Lucia is not a certified
law student under the state student-practice rule, because the rule does not
cover her work in this public-interest setting,37 and because she need not be
certified as a student lawyer to engage in welfare hearing representation.
38
" Mike Newman is a volunteer intern at ELSI. He is a nineteen-year-old
sophomore at Tufts University, and he has been assisting ELSI this year with
clerical and administrative help.
Coletta, with Bartholomew as her supervisor, intends to use her team to perform all of
the legal work for the MCDC transactions, including drafting all of the real estate
documents; researching the applicable law governing deed restrictions and zoning
requirements; counseling MCDC about its legal options regarding the deed restrictions
and covenants to be included in the condominium documents, as well as the terms of
35. For a discussion of this kind of housing program, see CHARLES E. DAVE, Orro J.
HERTZEL, JAMES A. KUSHNER, HENRY W. MCGEE, JR., ROBERT W. WASHBURN, PETER W.
SALSICH, JR., W. DENNIS KEATING & DANIEL R. MANDELKER, HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 240-43 (3d ed. 1999); Rochelle E. Lento, Federal
Sources of Financing, in THE LEGAL GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 215, 235-
39 (Tim Iglesias & Rochelle E. Lento eds., 2006). See also 42 U.S.C. § 12771(a) (1992)
(requiring fifteen percent of HOME funds to be distributed to nonprofits like MCDC).
36. See MASS. R. SUP. JuD. CT. 3:03. Under the Massachusetts student-practice rule, David
may appear as a lawyer in the district courts of Massachusetts, so he may try cases in those
courts, just as a fully licensed lawyer may do.
37. See id. at 3:03(8) (explaining that a second-year student may only be certified in
Massachusetts if she is enrolled in a law school clinical program).
38. See generally Remmert, supra note 4, at 577.
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the sales; negotiating discrete terms with the buyers or the buyers' lawyers; and
representing MCDC at each of the closings.
This story presents five individuals working within a proper law firm39 engaged in
the representation of a client on a legal matter. This story also describes five persons,
only two of whom are deemed lawyers licensed to practice law in Massachusetts (Joe
Bartholomew and David Dahlstrom). The question is what activities any of these five
persons may engage in to represent MCDC. To answer that question, we must canvass
the substantive law governing nonlawyer practice within a law firm, as well as the
advisory authority on that topic. Because it tends to be clearer (if at times inconsistent),
we will start with the advisory authority and then connect those teachings to the
binding law on the topic.
II. ADVISORY GUIDANCE AND SUBSTANTWE LAW REGULATING NONLAWYER
PRACTICE
A. Advisory Rhetoric
Only licensed lawyers may represent clients, of course, but all authorities agree that
lawyers may delegate tasks to nonlawyers to assist them in that representation. The
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers ("Restatement")4° describes the
scope of a nonlawyer's role as follows:
For obvious reasons of convenience and better service to clients, lawyers and law
firms are empowered to retain nonlawyer personnel to assist firm lawyers in
providing legal services to clients. In the course of that work, a nonlawyer may
conduct activities that, if conducted by that person alone in representing a client,
would constitute unauthorized practice. Those activities are permissible and do not
constitute unauthorized practice, so long as the responsible lawyer or law firm
provides appropriate supervision (see § 11, Comment e), and so long as the
nonlawyer is not permitted to own an interest in the law firm, split fees, or exercise
management powers with respect to a law-practice aspect of the firm (see § 10).41
39. A legal services organization is a law firm entitled to practice law, in precisely the same
fashion as any private law firm partnership, professional corporation (PC), or limited liability
partnership (LLP). See, e.g., MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.0(c) (2009); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF Tm LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123(2) (2002) (providing that lawyers in a legal
services organization are treated as members of a law firm).
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2002).
41. Id. § 4 cmt. g. The Restatement's citation of section 11, comment e is perplexing and
possibly reflects a clerical error in the Restatement text. Section 11, commentf addresses the
lawyer's supervisory responsibility for nonlawyers, while comment e addresses supervising
subordinate lawyers. Perhaps, then, the drafters intended to refer to commentf instead of e. On
the other hand, because commentfstates that "[d]uties corresponding to those of a lawyer with
respect to other firm lawyers exist with respect to supervising nonlawyers in a law firm," id. §
11 cmt. f, the drafters may have intended to refer the reader to comment e for guidance about
supervision obligations generally.
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Aside from its recognition that lawyers may not assign management, equity, and
ownership interests to nonlawyers,42 the Restatement's proposition does not suggest
any categorical exclusions from its basic lesson that, with "appropriate supervision,"
lawyers may assign any of their work to nonlawyers, including the provision of legal
advice. 3 The Restatement warns lawyers to establish supervision protocols to "assure
that any advice given [by the nonlawyer] is appropriate."
The Restatement position is entirely sensible,45 and it supports the thesis developed
in this Article. But the Restatement does not acknowledge, either in its comments or its
Reporter's Notes, a widespread and long-standing contrary assertion-that a lawyer
may not delegate certain legal tasks to a nonlawyer, even if the lawyer supervises the
nonlawyer and retains full responsibility for the resulting client representation work.
An American Bar Association (ABA) formal ethics opinion introduced the concept of
certain categorical exclusions with the following advice to the bar in 1968: "[W]e do
not limit the kind of assistants the lawyer can acquire in any way to persons who are
admitted to the Bar, so long as the nonlawyers do not do things that lawyers may not do
or do the things that lawyers only may do."4 The emphasized language suggests that
some lawyering tasks are beyond delegation, and the Committee's opinion makes clear
that it refers not to the management, equity interest, or ownership considerations that
the Restatement carved out.47 The opinion identifies two categorical limitations on
lawyer delegation to nonlawyers: "counsel[ing] clients about law matters' 4 8 and
"appear[ing] in court or ... in formal proceedings that are a part of the judicial
process.,49
The restrictions suggested by the ABA in 1968 have appeared frequently, and
continue to appear, in advisory authorities. The South Carolina Supreme Court has
suggested, in dictum, a similar limitation on the scope of the nonlawyer's role:
The activities of a paralegal do not constitute the practice of law as long as they
are limited to work of a preparatory nature, such as legal research, investigation,
or the composition of legal documents, which enable the licensed attorney-
employer to carry a given matter to a conclusion through his own examination,
approval or additional effort.50
42. Id. § 10 cmt. c. The exceptions to that conclusion identified within the Restatement are
not categorical ones excluding certain lawyering activities, but only address ownership and
management functions within the law firm, restrictions that are not at all controversial. See
supra note 27 (describing the restrictions on lay participation in law firms, and noting critiques
of the restrictions).
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. g (2002).
44. Id. § ll cmt. f.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 160-72.
46. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof' I Responsibility, Formal Op. 316 (1967) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 316].
47. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. g (2002).
48. ABA Formal Op. 316, supra note 46.
49. Id. The opinion does identify a third categorical exclusion, "engag[ing] directly in the
practice of law," id., but that limitation contributes nothing useful to the inquiry. It begs the
question it purports to answer.
50. In re Easler, 272 S.E.2d 32, 32-33 (S.C. 1980) (emphasis added) (dictum) (footnote
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina later amplified its statement in Easier by
asserting that a nonlawyer's "answering legal questions would constitute the
unauthorized practice of law."
51
In 2001, the assistant professionalism counsel of the ABA Center for Professional
Responsibility described the ABA's limitations on what lawyers should not delegate to
nonlawyers as follows: "The ABA Model Guidelines for the Utilization of Legal
Assistant Services delineate three responsibilities a lawyer may not delegate to a legal
assistant: establishing an attorney-client relationship, setting the fee to be charged for a
legal service, and rendering a legal opinion to a client."52 Similarly, the Code ofEthics
and Professional Responsibility of the National Association of Legal Assistants
(NALA) advises its members that they may not "give legal opinions or advice." 53
Several state bar ethics opinions and guidelines for paralegal practice echo the same
categorical exclusion for offering legal advice54 and, sometimes, for negotiating on
behalf of a client.55 However, the most recent iteration of the ABA Model Paralegal
Guidelines suggests a more thoughtful approach. While the Guidelines categorically
exclude delegating "responsibility for a legal opinion rendered to a client,"5 6 they
qualify that ban with a recognition that nonlawyers may "be authorized to communicate
a lawyer's legal advice to a client so long as they do not interpret or expand on that
advice. 57
omitted). The South Carolina Supreme Court later, in more dicta, expanded on the Easier
precedent to claim that nonlawyers may not provide legal advice. See Doe v. Condon, 532
S.E.2d 879 (S.C. 2000).
51. Condon, 532 S.E.2d at 883 (dictum).
52. Kathleen Maher, No Substitutions: Legal Aides Are Crucial, but Some Tasks Lawyers
Should Not Delegate, 87 A.B.A. J. 66 (2001) (emphasis added). Maher was describing the
ABA's Model Guidelines for Legal Assistants as they existed in 2001. The 2004 Model
Paralegal Guidelines offer a more nuanced approach, implying that nonlawyers may delegate
counseling tasks if properly supervised. See MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE UTILIZATION OF
PARALEGAL SERVS. Guideline 1 (2004); see also infra text accompanying notes 147-48.
53. NALA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 11, at Canon 3. The NALA Canon also includes the
restriction against "represent[ing] a client before a court or agency unless so authorized by that
court or agency." Id.
54. See, e.g., N.H. SUP. CT. R. 35; Fla. Bar, Ethics Opinion 89-5 (1989),
http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/TFBETOpin.nsf/Ethicslndex?OpenForm (search "Ethics Opinion
Search" for "89-5"; then follow "Ethics, Opinion 89-5" hyperlink) (allowing nonlawyers to
handle real estate closings so long as, among other things, the nonlawyer does not furnish legal
advice); State Bar of Ga., Advisory Opinion 21 (1977), http://www.gabar.org/handbook/state
_disciplinary board opinions/advop_2 / (prohibiting "[a]ny contact with clients or opposite
counsel requiring the rendering of legal advice of any type"); STATE BAR OF MICH., ROLE OF
NONLAWYERS IN LAW PRACTICE: GUIDELINES FOR UTILIZATION OF LEGAL ASSISTANT SERVICES
Guideline 2 cmt. b, http://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/utilization.cfn (explaining that a
nonlawyer may not "convey to persons outside the law firm the legal assistant's opinion" about
legal matters); VAPA GUIDELINES, supra note 29 (providing that a"paralegal shall not give legal
advice or opinions").
55. For sources addressing negotiation limits, see infra note 165.
56. MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE UTILIZATION OF PARALEGAL SERVS. Guideline 3 cmt.
(2004).
57. Id. at Guideline 6 cmt.
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Of course, none of the sources just quoted or cited represents binding legal authority
for any practicing lawyer. 8 State ethics opinions are advisory and do not carry
enforcement authority.59 The Restatement also does not represent binding substantive
law, 60 although it enjoys considerable respect within American jurisprudence.6 1
B. Authority from State Rules or Statutes
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, while themselves simply advisory and
not binding on any lawyers, serve as the basis for most states' substantive rules
governing lawyer conduct.62 The comment to Rule 5.5 offers some general, although
vague, support for a more expansive view of the lawyer's discretionary delegation
authority. Comment 2 declares that Rule 5.5's ban on the unauthorized practice of law
"does not prohibit a lawyer from employing the services of paraprofessionals and
delegating functions to them, so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and
retains responsibility for their work., 63 The comment does not say any or all functions,
but neither does it offer any limitation on a lawyer's delegation of supervised activity.
6 4
Apart from that authority within Rule 5.5, a handful of states provide for more
discrete guidance to lawyers using nonlawyer assistants, as well as to the nonlawyers
58. The language quoted above from the opinion of the South Carolina Supreme Court,
supra text accompanying note 50, was dictum in the case before the court. See In re Easler, 272
S.E.2d 32, 32-33 (S.C. 1980).
59. See Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Toward More Effective
Regulation of Lawyers' Conduct, 15 GEo. J. LEGAL ETrIcs 313, 382 (2002) (arguing that the
varying levels of authority of ethics opinions in jurisdictions lead to their uncertain authority as
a source of advice for lawyers).
60. See Monroe H. Freedman, Caveat Lector: Conflicts of Interest of ALI Members in
Drafting the Restatements, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 641 (1998) (explaining that the Restatement
provisions are influenced by ALI members' interests); Harold G. Maier, The Utilitarian Role of
a Restatement of Conflicts in a Common Law System: How Much Judicial Deference Is Due to
the Restaters or "Who Are These Guys, Anyway?, " 75 IND. L.J. 541, 548 (2000) (arguing that
no restatement has any independent legal force, and can never be more than a guide); Ted
Schneyer, The ALIs Restatement and the ABA's Model Rules: Rivals or Complements?, 46
OKLA. L. REV. 25, 30 (1993) (arguing that professional ethics law is far from uniform; any
attempt to "restate" it must make policy choices and must pass judgment on the Model Rules);
Fred C. Zacharias, Fact andFiction in the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers: Shouldthe
Confidentiality Provisions Restate the Law?, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 903, 926 (1993)
(explaining that individual states have made a conscious choice to address idiosyncratic
jurisprudential differences, thus making any attempt to restate the law governing lawyers
ineffective).
61. See generally Lawrence J. Latto, The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: A
View from the Trenches, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 697 (1998) (reviewing the deliberation and debate
involved with the creation of the Restatement); Judith A. McMorrow, The (F) Utility of Rules:
Regulating Attorney Conduct in Federal Court Practice, 58 SMU L. REV. 3, 36 (2005) (noting
that the Restatement took fifteen years to complete).
62. See JOHN S. DZIENKowsKI, PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBLITY: STANDARDS, RuLES AND
STATuTEs 210 (2009) (noting that forty-seven states have crafted their attorney conduct
provisions after the Model Rules).
63. MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 2 (2009).
64. See id.
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themselves, regarding the scope of activity permitted to be delegated. In California, the
only state in the country which licenses and regulates the practice of paralegals,65 the
licensing statute states that a "paralegal shall not ... [p]rovide legal advice." 66 Neither
the statute itself nor any available interpretation of it tells us whether that ban applies
only to independent legal advice, or whether its intention is to prohibit any
communication of legal advice, even advice originating from the supervising lawyer.
67
The Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of New Hampshire offer "Guidelines
for the Utilization by Lawyers of the Services of Legal Assistants," and those rules
include a comment that refers to a lawyer's obligation to ensure that a legal assistant
"does not provide legal advice." 68 That prohibition, labeled as a comment but likely
qualifying as binding substantive law in New Hampshire, indicates by its surrounding
language that its intent is to prohibit only unsupervised legal advice by a nonlawyer.
69
The Rules Governing Paralegal Services of the State Bar of New Mexico state that "[a]
paralegal shall not.., provide legal advice." 70 Like the New Hampshire limitation, that
prohibition, which appears to have the force of law in New Mexico,7 1 seems only to
apply to unsupervised, independent legal advice.
72
65. Susan Mae McCabe, A Brief History of the Paralegal Profession, MicH. B. J., Jul.
2007, at 18, 19.
66. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6450(b) ("Notwithstanding subdivision (a), a paralegal shall
not do the following: (1) Provide legal advice .. "). Subsection (a) states that "[t]asks
performed by a paralegal include, but are not limited to" a list of identified tasks, including
"case planning, development, and management; legal research; interviewing clients; fact
gathering and retrieving information; drafting and analyzing legal documents." Id. § 6450(a).
Subsection (a)'s "including but not limited to" language implies that a lawyer may decide in her
judgment how to employ a legal assistant, but subsection (b) limits the lawyer's discretion and
prohibits delegation of the task of providing client advice.
67. No court or agency has interpreted this language from the statute. For a discussion of
New Hampshire's statutory treatment of the legal advice question, see infra notes 68-69 and
accompanying text (explaining that its ban most reasonably applies only to independent or
unsupervised legal opinions).
68. N.H. SUP. CT. R. 35 cmt.
69. See id. Administrative Rule 35 integrates Rule 5.3 of the New Hampshire Rules of
Professional Conduct, which mimics Model Rule 5.3. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2009), with N.H. SUP. CT. R. 35 cmt. c. ("It is the responsibility of the lawyer
to take all steps reasonably necessary to ensure that a legal assistant for whose work the lawyer
is responsible does not provide legal advice or otherwise engage in the unauthorized practice of
law; provided, however, that with adequate lawyer supervision the legal assistant may provide
information concerning legal matters and otherwise act as permitted under these rules.") The
word "otherwise" in the phrase "does not provide legal advice or otherwise engage in the
unauthorized practice of law" implies that this rule is aimed at preventing nonlawyers from
providing their own, unsupervised advice, and therefore engaging in the practice of law. The
final clause, explicitly allowing nonlawyers to communicate legal information (which one infers
can include "advice") to a client, supports strongly the reading that a nonlawyer, if supervised
by a lawyer and not acting independently, may offer legal advice to a client.
70. STATE BAR OF N.M., RULES GOVERNING PARALEGAL SERVICES R. 20-103 (2004),
available at http://www.nmbar.org/AboutSBNM/ParalegalDivision/PDrulesgovparalegalservice
s.html.
71. The State Bar of New Mexico is an integrated bar with powers delegated from the
Supreme Court of New Mexico. The Board of Bar Commissioners of the State Bar is a "bod[y]
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C. Authority from the Common Law
No court has held that lawyers cannot delegate certain categories of supervised
work to nonlawyers.73 Many courts have disciplined lawyers for assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law or for similar misconduct by improper delegation of legal
tasks to nonlawyers,74 in violation of each jurisdiction's respective version of Model
of the judicial department." N.M. STAT. § 36-2-9.1 (1979). I infer from that statute that the rules
governing the legal profession issued by the State Bar are enforceable. An "integrated bar
association" is an "association of attorneys in which membership and dues are required as a
condition of practicing law in a State." Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 5 (1990). For a
discussion of integrated bar associations, see, for example, Elizabeth Chambliss & Bruce A.
Green, Some Realism About Bar Associations, 57 DEPAUL L. REv. 425 (2008); Bradley A.
Smith, The Limits of Compulsory Professionalism: How the Unified Bar Harms the Legal
Profession, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 35 (1994).
72. The Committee Commentary to explains the rules' "no legal advice" provision as
follows:
Some activities which would involve the unauthorized practice of law if
undertaken by the paralegal include: (a) independently recommending a course of
conduct or a particular action to a client; (b) evaluating for or speculating with a
client on the probable outcome of litigation, negotiations or other proposed action;
(c) independently outlining rights or obligations to a client; and (d) independently
interpreting statutes, decisions or legal documents to a client.
STATE BAR OF N.M., supra note 70, at R. 20-103 cmt. The repeated reference to "independently"
indicates that the nonlawyer may communicate such information to a client if done under the
supervision and monitoring of a licensed lawyer. For a discussion of the best understanding of a
nonlawyer's role in counseling clients, see infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
73. Compare MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE UTILIZATION OF PARALEGAL SERvicES Guideline 3
(2004) ("A lawyer may not delegate to a paralegal ... (3) Responsibility for a legal opinion
rendered to a client."), with id. at Guideline 3 cmt. (citing certain ethics opinions but failing to
cite any court decisions or statutes in its discussion of the limitation on a nonlawyer offering
legal advice). The comment to Guideline 3 cites the Kentucky Supreme Court Rules, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court Rules, and the New Mexico State Bar Rules to support its
proposition that paralegals are generally "forbidden from 'giving legal advice' or 'counseling
clients about legal matters."' Id. at Guideline 3 cmt. The citation to the Kentucky rule is
particularly troubling, and perhaps inappropriate, because the cited rule explicitly permits
supervised nonlawyers to offer legal advice. Ky. SuP. CT. R. 3.700, Sub-Rule 2 (providing that
"the unauthorized practice of law shall not include any service rendered involving legal
knowledge or legal advice" so long as the client knows the individual is not a lawyer, the lawyer
supervises the nonlawyer, and the lawyer retains ultimate responsibility). For a discussion about
both the New Hampshire rules and the New Mexico rules in this regard, see supra notes 68-72
and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., People v. Laden, 893 P.2d 771 (Colo. 1995) (public censure for lawyer
"aiding nonlawyers in the practice of law by assisting the nonlawyers in selling 'living trust'
document packages"); People v. Cassidy, 884 P.2d 309 (Colo. 1994) (attorney suspended, inter
alia, for aiding nonlawyers in preparing and marketing "living trust packages"); Fla. Bar v.
Abrams, 919 So. 2d 425,428 (Fla. 2006) (attorney suspended for, inter alia, assisting layperson
in practice of law); Fla. Bar v. Beach, 675 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1996) (attorney suspended for
assisting layperson in practice of law); In re Mopsik, 902 So. 2d 991 (La. 2005) (sixty-day
suspension for failing to supervise a paralegal's work on a case, at least some of which
constituted the unauthorized practice of law); In re Sledge, 859 So .2d 671 (La. 2003) (lawyer
disbarred, in part, for failure to supervise nonlawyer employees).
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Rule 5.3,75 Model Rule 5.5(a),76 or some similar professional duty in that jurisdiction.
Courts often include dicta indicating that a lawyer cannot delegate certain sensitive
tasks, like the provision of legal advice, to a nonlawyer. 7 But each reported case in
which a lawyer found himself or herself in trouble as a result of the use of a nonlawyer
involved some variation of a failure of supervision of the nonlawyer. No reported
court decision has disciplined a lawyer or sanctioned a nonlawyer for competent,
supervised activity by the nonlawyer.
Courts do say on occasion that lawyers cannot delegate certain categories of work to
nonlawyers. For instance, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in an opinion disbarring a
lawyer for assisting in the unauthorized practice of law by inappropriate delegation of
legal work to a nonlawyer, offered one of the narrowest conceptions of the scope of
permissible delegation:
[W]e conclude.., that a lawyer may delegate various tasks to... non-lawyers;
that he or she may not, however, delegate to any such person the lawyer's role of
appearing in court in behalf of a client or of giving legal advice to a client; that he
or she must supervise closely any such person to whom he or she delegates other
tasks, including the preparation of a draft of a legal document or the conduct of
legal research; and that the lawyer must not under any circumstance delegate to
such person the exercise of the lawyer's professional judgment in behalf of the
client or even allow it to be influenced by the non-lawyer's assistance,
79
This quote, intended perhaps to communicate a binding standard for Louisiana
lawyers,8 0 suggests a remarkably narrow scope of permissible delegation of authority
75. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2009).
76. Id. at R. 5.5(a) ("A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the
regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.").
77. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Thomson, 310 So. 2d 300, 302 (Fla. 1975) (nonlawyer work limited
to that of a "preparatory nature"); Doe v. Condon, 532 S.E.2d 879, 880 (S.C. 2000)
("[A]nswering legal questions would constitute the unauthorized practice of law."); In re Easler,
272 S.E.2d 32, 32 (S.C. 1980) (explaining that paralegal work should be "limited to work of a
preparatory nature").
78. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, What Constitutes Unauthorized Practice of Law by
Paralegal, 109 A.L.R. 5th 275 (2003 & Supp. 2009). A review of the many cases collected in
this Annotation reveals no instances in which a properly supervised paralegal, or the supervising
lawyer, faced any sanctions, regardless of the type of work performed by the paralegal. One
reported decision demonstrates that supervision is more important than the quality of the work.
See In re Pinkins, 213 B.R. 818 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997). The Pinkins court rejected, in part, a
fee petition submitted by a "high volume filer" law firm in twenty-one bankruptcy cases. Id. at
819, 825. While the court found that the nonlawyers were "acting without direct supervision of
an attorney," id. at 821, the court did not find that the services rendered were incompetent, id. In
response to the firm's argument that "the legal assistants employed by the.., law firm are very
well trained, and that the legal services, although not provided by an attorney, are of the highest
quality," the court noted that "[t]his argument misses the point. Legal assistants are not
authorized to practice law." Id.
79. La. State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 540 So. 2d 294, 300 (La. 1989) (emphasis added).
80. See id. at 299-300 ("[Tlhe supreme authority resides in this court to define, by formal
rules or by adjudication of cases, the acts or courses of conduct which constitute the practice of
law. . . .In defining the practice of law for purposes of interpreting DR 3-101(A) [the
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from lawyers to nonlawyers. It includes the common prohibition against "giving legal
advice to a client," but it proceeds to reinforce that ban with an edict forbidding
lawyers even from accepting the influence of the nonlawyers with whom they work.
That order is as nonsensical as it is unenforceable. It is also, fortunately, dictum.
8
'
Like virtually all of the matters reviewed by state courts in this area, the facts of the
matter before the Louisiana Supreme Court did not even come close to a lawyer having
delegated supervised activity to a nonlawyer assistant or accepting some insights from
the nonlawyer. The story of Louisiana State Bar Association v. Edwins is one of
grossly unauthorized practice by a nonlawyer with no supervision by a lawyer, and
with a heady dose of malpractice thrown in. Rallie C. Edwins, a Baton Rouge lawyer,
had agreed to take over the Louisiana business of one Rob Robertson, who had been
"operat[ing] a free lance paralegal service in New Iberia under the name of Prepaid
Legal Services, Inc.",8 2 Edwins changed the name of Robertson's office to his law firm
name, but retained his own law office in Baton Rouge. Robertson then independently
met in his New Iberia office a man who had a personal injury claim, told the man that
he, Robertson, was a lawyer, filed suit in Edwins's name on the man's behalf, and soon
settled the case for a $1000 net payment to the man, without obtaining the man's
informed consent or providing him any advance notice of the terms of the settlement.
83
Not surprisingly, the Louisiana Supreme Court was not amused. It found "an
ongoing relationship in which Edwins allowed Robertson to perform legal tasks
without supervision and to exercise professional judgment properly reserved only for
attomeys." 84 The court imposed a sanction of disbarment.
85
The Edwins matter, while perhaps a bit extreme in the level of malfeasance and lack
of supervision, is typical of the cases in which courts discuss the limits of nonlawyer
assistance. Courts employ language indicating categorical and often narrow limits on a
lawyer's discretion to delegate activity to an assistant, but the facts of the matters being
decided consistently demonstrate a patent absence of supervision and oversight. If one
ignores the dicta, then, one would conclude confidently the following insight from the
common law authority-lawyers may not, on penalty of assisting unauthorized
practice, delegate unsupervised activity to nonlawyers. That is the only lesson available
from the common law authority. The lesson tells us nothing about the limits of
responsible, supervised delegation.
disciplinary rule applicable to this matter], this court may consider as persuasive, but not
binding, pertinent legislative expressions.").
81. Note that the ABA's Model Guidelines for the Utilization of Paralegal Services
expressly disagree with the sentiment expressed by the Louisiana Supreme Court. MODEL
GUIDELINES FOR THE UTILIZATION OF PARALEGAL SERVS. Guideline 3 cmt. (2004) ("[A] lawyer
who permits a paralegal to assist.., in preparing the lawyer's legal opinion is not delegating
responsibility for [that] matter[] and, therefore, is not in violation of this guideline.").
82. Edwins, 540 So. 2d at 297. Under any relevant legal standard, a nonlawyer offering
prepaid legal services would be engaged unlawfully in the unauthorized practice of law. See,
e.g., Fla. Barv. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1978).
83. Edwins, 540 So. 2d at 297. Even a licensed lawyer may not settle a client's matter
without obtaining the client's informed consent. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a)
(2004); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 22(1) (2002); WOLFRAM,
supra note 4, § 4.6.2, at 169-70.
84. Edwins, 540 So. 2d at 301.
85. Id. at 304.
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D. Insights from the Attorney-Client Privilege Cases
While no court has expressly declared (aside from in dictum) that a lawyer may not
delegate certain categories of legal activity to her nonlawyer assistant, neither has any
court expressly held that such delegation of the most commonly cited forbidden
activity-providing legal advice to a client-is in fact proper. No reported decision
appears, for instance, where a court has reviewed a disciplinary matter against a lawyer
charged with assisting the unauthorized practice of law by delegating a supervised legal
counseling task to a nonlawyer, and then proceeded to find the delegation proper.8 6 On
that specific question within the realm of professional discipline, no discrete common-
law authority exists on either side of the matter. Several courts, though, have implicitly
concluded that a lawyer's delegation to a nonlawyer of the task of communicating legal
advice is indeed proper.8 7 The topic arises in cases reviewing claims of attorney-client
privilege.
In reviewing assertions of attorney-client privilege 88 in circumstances involving
communications between clients and paralegals working for an attorney, several courts
have concluded that legal advice communicated by a nonlawyer to a client is within the
scope of the attorney-client privilege if the nonlawyer was acting under the supervision
of the licensed lawyer. 89 Consistent with that principle, courts have denied the claim of
privilege after concluding that the nonlawyer was acting independent of the lawyer's
supervision, and not as an integral part of the lawyer's provision of legal services. 90 In
both instances, the relevant consideration is whether the nonlawyer was offering
86. See Zitter, supra note 78 (ALR compilation reviewing available decisions on nonlawyer
practice limitations, and showing no such case).
87. See, e.g., Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 298 (E.D.N.Y.
1992); Foseco Int'l Ltd. v. Fireline, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Smart Indus. Corp.
v. Superior Court (Bradshaw), 876 P.2d 1176 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
88. The attorney-client privilege is a common-law doctrine protecting communications
between a lawyer and a client made for purposes of obtaining or providing legal assistance.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 68-82 (2002); 8 JoHN HENRY
WiGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT CoMMoN LAW § 2292 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
89. See, e.g., Stryker Corp., 145 F.R.D. at 305 n.3 ("[A]ttorney-client privilege may apply
to communications between an attorney, client and an independent patent agent, 'if that patent
agent is working on behalf of and under the direction of the attorney."'); Foseco Int'l Ltd., 546
F. Supp. at 25 (stating that privilege applies where a "patent agent is acting at the direction or
control of an attorney as the agent of the attorney"); Bradshaw, 876 P.2d at 1181 (stating that
privilege applies to communications with nonlawyer given "the necessary role of nonlawyer
assistants in modern litigation practice").
90. See, e.g., HPD Labs., Inc. v. Clorox Co., 202 F.R.D. 410, 411, 415 (D.N.J. 2001)
(paralegal offered her own independent counsel); Byrnes v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, No.
98Civ.8520(BSJ)(MHD), 1999 WL 1006312, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1999) (noting that the
privilege does not "cover communications between a non-attorney and a client that involve the
conveyance of legal advice offered by the non-attorney"); John Labatt Ltd. v. Molson
Breweries, 898 F. Supp. 471, 477 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (finding privilege inapplicable because
legal employee did not act as a conduit to and from counsel); United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 360-61 (D. Mass. 1950) (finding that privilege did not apply to
patent department employees rendering their own legal and business advice).
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independent advice unconnected to the lawyer's work and supervision, or whether the
nonlawyer's advice was essentially a "conduit" 91 for the lawyer's judgment.92
The courts addressing the privilege question accept that nonlawyers will meet with
clients and discuss the law. As one federal district court judge wrote, "There is nothing
wrong with Clorox employees [(the law firm's clients)] using Ms. Peeff [(a law firm
paralegal)] as a legal resource.. . .",93 If the legal information communicated by the
nonlawyer represents her transmission of advice crafted with the lawyer's supervision
and under the lawyer's responsibility, the privilege will apply, even if the attorney does
not speak the words to the client.94 By contrast, if the nonlawyer communicates her
own independent and unapproved legal advice, the claim of privilege fails.9
Of course, decisions interpreting the scope of the attorney-client privilege are not
directly dispositive on the questions surrounding the unauthorized practice of law.
They do, however, offer constructive support for the proposition that supervised
nonlawyers may, under the right circumstances, provide legal advice to clients. The
attorney-client privilege only applies to communications related to the provision of
legal advice. 96 The case law holds that a nonlawyer's communications to a client about
legal matters will fall within the scope of the privilege if the nonlawyer is supervised
by a lawyer and is communicating to the client as part of a lawyer's representation of
91. See HPD Labs., 202 F.R.D. at 416; Labatt Ltd., 898 F. Supp. at 477 (employing the
"conduit" concept).
92. See Occidental Chem. Corp. v. OHM Remediation Servs. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 431,435
(W.D.N.Y. 1997) (no privilege absent proof that non-attorney was hired to assist counsel); Nat'l
Hockey League Players' Ass'n v. Bettman, No. 93Civ.5769(KMW), 1994 WL 38130, at *12
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1994) ("constructive employee" theory); Stryker Corp., 145 F.R.D. at 305 n.3
(same); Foseco Int'lLtd., 546 F. Supp. at 25 ("direction and control"); Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon
Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 146 (D. Del. 1977) (holding a nonlawyer communication may fall
under attorney-client privilege if the nonlawyer was "working at the direction of and under the
supervision of an attorney"); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26,39 (D. Md. 1974)
(noting that documents prepared at lawyer's direction may be protected); Congoleum Indus. v.
G.A.F. Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1969), affid, 478 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973) (same); cf
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975) (stating that the work product doctrine
"protect[s] materials prepared by agents for the attorney"); United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d
1495, 1499 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing that "the privilege . . . can extend to shield
communications to others when the purpose of the communication is to assist the attorney in
rendering advice to the client"); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961) (same); 2
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 503(a)(3)[01], at 503-26
to -27 (1990) (privilege protects communications to attorney's agents).
93. HPD Labs., 202 F.R.D. at 415.
94. Id. at 416 (privilege applies if the nonlawyers "pass on that attorney's advice to the
client" (citing Labatt Ltd., 898 F. Supp. at 477) or "advice formulated 'under the supervision
and at the direction of an attorney' (quoting Byrnes, 1999 WL 1006312, at *4)).
95. See id. ("Courts do not, however, safeguard advice that paralegals develop and
disseminate on their own."); cf UnitedShoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 360-61 (finding that
privilege did not apply to patent department employees who rendered their own legal and
business advice).
96. See United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that "the
privilege protects communications between a client and an attorney, not communications that
prove important to an attorney's legal advice to a client"); NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION 265-67 (4th ed. 2008).
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the client. That common-law authority refutes the broad claims from some advisory
sources and court dicta that nonlawyers may not offer legal advice to a client. It also
permits us to understand better the contextual nature of the ban on giving legal advice.
That ban only makes sense when applied to entirely independent legal advice,
unsupervised by a lawyer and reliant entirely on the skill and judgment of the
nonlawyer. A prohibition on that activity is a sensible one, assuming again, for present
purposes, the validity of the unauthorized-practice-of-law dogma.97
III. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING DELEGATION TO
NONLAWYERS
A. Introduction and Overview
Up to this point we have seen that much of the advisory authority from bar
associations and professional associations warns attorneys about categorical limits on
what tasks they may permissibly and lawfully delegate to the nonlawyers with whom
they work, and those authorities most often declare that an attorney may not delegate to
a nonlawyer the responsibility of giving legal advice. Occasionally, those authorities
also include negotiation as a nondelegable task.98 We have also seen, though, that there
is no binding legal authority establishing such a categorical proscription. No lawyer has
ever been disciplined or charged criminally, and no nonlawyer has ever been charged
criminally, for supervised, responsible work performed by a nonlawyer as part of a
lawyer's representation. We may thus conclude that the state of the law in this area is,
at best, uncertain and confusing.
This Part responds to that uncertainty and confusion. I propose here a conceptual
framework for guiding lawyers in their delegation decisions. The framework is
consistent with the slim available substantive law, and in fact it is consistent as well
with most of the advisory authority, once interpreted through a lens of practical
lawyering judgment. The conceptual framework I suggest understands the lawyer's
delegation of work to a nonlawyer as essentially a question of risk management,
appraised by the lawyer's practical wisdom and subject to her client's informed
consent. Understood as such, a practicing attorney could accept comfortably the thesis
introduced at the beginning of this Article-a thesis that rejects categorical exclusions
in favor of a discretionary standard governed by professional competence and
fiduciary-duty-of-care considerations.
To develop this conceptual framework, I first describe briefly the roles that risk
management and client-centered decision making play in ordinary lawyering practice
and connect those normative constructs to the prevailing understanding of
97. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., FLA. BAR, FLORIDA ETHIcs GUIDE FOR PARALEGALS AND ATTORNEYS WHO
UTILIZE PARALEGALS, Part III (2006) ("A nonlawyer who engages in negotiations risks
committing [unauthorized practice of law]."); Fla. Bar Comm. on Prof' Ethics, Ethics Op. 74-
35 (1974) (negotiating with insurance adjusters "always involve[s] the exercise of the lawyer's
professional judgment"); cf Fla. Barv. Neiman, 816 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 2002) (discussing a
nonlawyer's improper negotiation, with no supervision); State ex rel. Or. State Bar v. Lenske,
584 P.2d 759, 764 (Or. 1978) (implying negotiation would be improper for a nonlawyer, but
finding no unauthorized practice of law because of presence of lawyer in the office).
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unauthorized-practice dogma. I then build upon that understanding to evaluate the
categories of activities that the authorities reviewed above consistently recognize as
properly delegable to nonlawyers: document drafting, legal research, fact investigation,
and client interviewing. Each permissive activity category obtains its justification
because of a perceived, underlying risk/benefit assessment supported by an assumed or
explicit client buy-in. Having unpacked those permissive categories, I then examine
one purported forbidden activity, legal counseling. We shall see that an application of
the same risk management and informed consent heuristics, with an appreciation of the
unauthorized-practice rationales, would not categorically deny a lawyer the opportunity
to delegate a counseling task to a properly supervised and talented nonlawyer if in the
lawyer's judgment the result would be competent and efficient legal work for which the
lawyer remains fully responsible.
B. Risk Assessment, Informed Consent, and Unauthorized-Practice Rationales
1. Risk Assessment and Practical Judgment
This Subpart describes briefly three readily accepted lawyering conceptions, all of
which are essential to an understanding of the subject of delegation to nonlawyers.
Competent lawyering always involves responsible assessment of risk and appreciation
of the cost/benefit probabilities inherent in any course of legal activity on a client's
behalf.99 A lawyer representing a client must always exercise her professional judgment
to discern when she has done enough legal work, what form that legal work will take,
and when to proceed to the next step in her strategic plan. 00 Except in the most banal
or routine of matters,' 0' a lawyer can never be certain that her lawyering activity will
99. See, e.g., GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR
CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY 202-304 (1978) (one of the earliest, and one of the best,
explorations of strategic planning in lawyering); SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO
THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS'N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 141-50 (1992) [hereinafter THE MAcCRATE REPORT] (discussing
"problem solving"); Alexander Scherr, Lawyers and Decisions: A Model ofPracticalJudgment,
47 VILL. L. REV. 161, 192 (2002) (connecting lawyering judgment to understanding risk
considerations).
100. See, e.g., RoY STUCKEY, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD
MAP 149 (2007) ("practical wisdom"); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH
WEGNER, LLOYD BOYD & LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 115-20 (2007) ("wisdom of practice").
101. One can imagine purely routine or technical legal matters where a lawyer need not
exercise judgment in order to accomplish a desired result for a client. However, as both the legal
realists and the critical legal studies (CLS) scholars have taught us, the legal process is seldom
that mechanical. See Scherr, supra note 99, at 183-95, 201-06 (developing the connection
between lawyering judgment and the indeterminacy recognized by realists and critical legal
studies adherents). For a discussion of realists and CLS thinkers, see Duncan Kennedy,
Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518,
559 (1986) (rejecting the argument "that the only permissible course of action for a judge
confronting a conflict between the law and how he wants to come out is always to follow the
law" (emphasis omitted)); Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465,
469-70, 536-41 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960
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achieve the result she seeks, but she uses her experience and her wisdom to proceed in
a way that maximizes the likelihood of reaching her goal.10 2 Exercising sound
lawyeringjudgment-with an appreciation for and careful calculation of the available
risks-is the hallmark of wise and competent lawyering
0 3
Consider the simplest of examples. Imagine that a client, Barbara, has retained a
lawyer, Shawn, to represent her in a dispute with a contractor, Jeffrey, who has
abandoned and not completed the agreed-upon work on her kitchen for which Barbara
has paid him. In this straightforward breach-of-contract matter, Shawn might engage in
the following tasks: He could interview Barbara, perform some legal research, develop
a strategy for his proceeding lawyering work, contact Jeffrey informally and then
formally through a demand letter, file a lawsuit in the state trial court, perform
discovery and file and respond to pretrial motions, negotiate with Jeffrey's lawyer,
counsel Barbara about settlement possibilities, and conduct the trial. For any one of
these tasks, Shawn must make calculated predictions and assessments about how to
proceed, using his developed lawyering judgments. In his initial interview of Barbara,
for instance, Shawn might spend an hour with his client, asking both open-ended
questions and narrow, focused inquiries. 1° 4 He would end the interview without
knowing for certain whether he has learned everything relevant to the matter at hand.
He could interview Barbara for days, asking every question imaginable, but he will not
do so, even if doing so is objectively safer for his information-gathering goals.10 5
Similarly, he will conduct some research, but after some effort he will stop that task as
well, believing (but without complete certainty) that he has an adequate grasp of the
substantive law. We could repeat this analysis for any one of the tasks on the above
list. 106
(1986)) (explaining legal realism and its connection to critical legal studies).
102. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 16 (1993) (developing the notion of practical wisdom as the soul of good
lawyering); Mark Neal Aaronson, We Ask You to Consider: Learning About PracticalJudgment
in Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REv. 247, 252-56 (1998) (explaining practical judgment); David
Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 31, 58-64 (1995) (same).
103. See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787, 814
(1989); Scherr, supra note 99, at 218-29.
104. See DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, SUSAN C. PRICE & PAUL R. TREMBLAY,
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (2d ed. 2004) (describing methods of
interviewing).
105. See KENNEY F. HEGLAND, TRIAL AND PRACTICE SKILLS IN ANUTSHELL 32-33 (3d ed.
2002) (explaining the tendency to "fill" when hearing incomplete stories).
106. Consider one further example of this point. Shawn might file a motion to compel
discovery after Jeffrey's lawyer objects to a request for production of documents. See, e.g., FED.
R. Civ. P. 37 (the federal rule permitting such a motion and imposing sanctions for failure to
respond to proper discovery; all states have an equivalent rule). In his choice to file the motion,
Shawn engages in a risk/benefit assessment-will the tactic succeed at a reasonable cost? Even
his drafting of the motion involves calculation of risk. He could file a two-page motion or a
four-page motion (or, conceivably, a 250-page motion). He will make certain arguments but not
others. He will make those choices by assessing, usually implicitly, the costs and benefits of the
available choices. See THOMAS A. MAUET, PRETRIAL § 6.15, at 293 (5th ed. 2002) ("[A]lways
consider not moving to compel discovery." (emphasis in original)).
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The point is that lawyers develop professional and practical judgment that permits
them to assess and manage risks and uncertainty. 10 7 Clients hire lawyers in large part
for this talent. But, at the same time, lawyers facing known risks cannot presume that
their clients' risk aversion is the same as theirs.108 For this reason, the exercise of
lawyering judgment is constrained by a powerful factor-the buy-in from the client.
2. Informed Consent
Lawyers are agents; their clients, principals. Lawyers act for, and at the behest of,
their clients.109 While the lawyer develops the intricacies of the strategies and provides
most of the expertise in lawyering practice, the client ultimately decides the fate of the
collaborative work and the course of the representation. 110 This statement is both a
truism and an overstatement. In light of the preceding discussion about risk
management, 1 ' it is impossible for a lawyer to include her client in all of the
cost/benefit decisions she must make on a daily basis."12 But on matters that may be
identified as representing important risk-drivenjunctures in a matter, the lawyer ought
to ensure that the client decides, because it is the client's comfort with risk that matters,
not the lawyer's. 113 This recognition is the essence of client centeredness."
4
107. See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul
Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY]; Susan
Bryant & Elliot S. Milstein, Rounds: A "Signature Pedagogy" for Clinical Education?, 14
CLINICAL L. REV. 195, 208-09 (2007) ("[P]rofessional work involves exercising practical
judgments under conditions of uncertainty.").
108. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 104, at 7,296 (suggesting lawyers explore their clients'
risk aversion scales). See generally DAN ARiELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES
THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 139-53 (2008) (explaining the complexities of making choices);
JOHN S. HAMMOND, RALPH L. KEENEY& HOWARD RAFFA, SMART CHOICES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO MAKING BETTER DECISIONS 135-39 (1999) (discussing people's differences in risk
tolerance); JONAH LEHRER, How WE DECIDE 133-66 (2009) (exploring individuals' deliberation
processes).
109. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. b (2002) ("A
lawyer is a fiduciary.").
110. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2004); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 21-22 (2002); see also William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client
Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. L. REv. 213, 225 (1991) (examining the usual
assumptions about client control and autonomy).
111. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
112. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 104, at 275-80; see also Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and
Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 51,
124 (1979) (noting the traditional proposition that substantive decisions rest with the client,
while procedural and tactical decisions typically rest with the lawyer, but critiquing that
distinction).
113. BINDER ET AL., supra note 104, at 296; see also ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D.
HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE
REPRESENTATION 26-27 (1990) (relating Carl Rogers' "client-centered" psychotherapy); ROBERT
F. COCHRAN, JR., JOHN M.A. DIPIPPA & MARTHA M. PETERS, THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A
COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 6-9 (2d ed. 2006);
Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L.
REV. 501, 507-09 (1990).
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Lawyers, then, may accept whatever level of risk taking or risk aversion the client
chooses, subject to the limits of the substantive law. Together, the lawyer and client
may collaborate about the measures the lawyer will take to accomplish the client's
goals, including the cost/benefit assessment of delegating some important tasks to a
nonlawyer. The substantive law of lawyering does not limit the lawyer and her client in
that collaborative enterprise except in two ways. First, the law prohibits a lawyer from
counseling her client to engage in illegal conduct, even if the client is willing to take
the risk of avoiding detection.' 15 Second, the law prohibits a client, even a
sophisticated and fully informed client, to accept the risk of proceeding in her legal
case with the representation of a nonlawyer alone." 6 That paternalistic" 7 stance forms
the basis for the unauthorized-practice-of-law dogma.
3. Unauthorized-Practice Rationales
The final subject we must review briefly to complete the backdrop for the
nonlawyer delegation framework is that of unauthorized practice of law. The
unauthorized-practice dogma is premised on a purely prophylactic sentiment-that
consumers and clients will receive the best legal services and the best protection if their
choice for representation is limited, by law, to members of the bar."l8 Its adherents
would readily accept that the unauthorized-practice dogma is overbroad, as all
prophylactic provisions are." 9 In some instances it will be true that some nonlawyers
would know far better than some lawyers how to proceed to obtain the best results for a
client. 20 In general, though, lawyers will serve clients better than nonlawyers would,
114. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 104, at 7-8; Dinerstein, supra note 113, at 585. For an
insightful application of client-centered decision making and risk assessment in the context of
representation of immigrants, see Christine N. Cimini, Ask, Don't Tell: Ethical Issues
Surrounding Undocumented Workers'Status in Employment Litigation, 61 STAN. L. REV. 355,
408-15 (2008).
115. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2009); Stephen L. Pepper,
Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics ofLawyering,
104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1588-90 (1995).
116. See CRYSTAL, supra note 96, at 480 (summarizing the unauthorized-practice-dogma
argument that "lay people are unable to evaluate the competency of nonlawyers").
117. See Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly, supra note 5, at 98-99 (labeling
unauthorized practice as "paternalism"); Jonathan Rose, Unauthorized Practice of Law in
Arizona: A Legal and Political Problem That Won't Go Away, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 585, 600
(2002) ("[I]f an individual makes a voluntary and knowing choice to use a non-lawyer because
she believed it would be better or cheaper than a lawyer, eliminating that alternative is
paternalistic and inconsistent with the policy favoring individual client autonomy that underlies
the law of lawyering.").
118. CRYSTAL, supra note 96, at 480; RHODE, supra note 3, at 74-77, 83.
119. The unauthorized-practice dogma is an example of the use of a rule, with clear dividing
lines, instead of a standard, with discretion available. The rules/standards dichotomy is a long-
standing one in legal regimes. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 571 (1992); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 379, 381-82 (1985). For a discussion of the use of prophylactic rules, notwithstanding
their overbreadth, see David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. C-. L. REV.
190 (1988); Tracy A. Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies Through the Looking
Glass of Bush v. Gore, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343, 344-45 (2002).
120. See Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their
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and because it will be difficult or even impossible to ascertain which nonlawyers might
be better qualified than a given lawyer, the policy underlying the unauthorized-practice
dogma insists upon its inflexible, bright-line test to assure, as a reliable proposition, the
best service to clients.' 2
Two other realities of the unauthorized-practice dogma deserve mention for our
purposes. First, it is obvious that the unauthorized-practice laws favor lawyers'
professional and business interests and are supported most strongly by the organized
bar.122 It is an anticompetitive social policy, one that tends to inflate lawyers'
incomes.12 3 Second, unauthorized-practice laws manifest a deep trust in lawyers and
their wise judgments about their own competence. The dogma's lack of nuance-its
explicit assumption that, as a rule, any lawyer will be a better representative of a client
than any nonlawyer, regardless of the latter's expertise and experience-imposes upon
lawyers a fiduciary duty to recognize when they are not competent to accept
representation of a client. That manifestation of trust ought to play an important role in
understanding the proper scope of a lawyer's delegation discretion.
C. The Nonlawyer Delegation Framework as an Alchemy of Risk Management,
Informed Consent, and Unauthorized-Practice Prophylaxis
1. The Alchemy
Consideration of the three factors we have just examined establishes that lawyers
ought to have discretion to delegate to nonlawyers any tasks which, in the lawyer's
professional judgment and subject to the informed consent of the client, will provide
the best and most efficient legal services to the client. Any substantive-law constraint
depriving a lawyer of the discretion to delegate certain categories of activity would be
inconsistent with the practice philosophies accepted within the legal profession. The
lawyer-discretion model builds upon the trust that lawyers will recognize competence
gaps and will manage risk responsibly, and will only delegate activities to nonlawyers
if the lawyer's client has bought in to any significant risk taking. For reasons of
economy and efficiency, a client is likely to buy in if the lawyer oversees the delegation
and vouches for its soundness.
A lawyer who elects to use a nonlawyer assistant to complete some legal tasks
frequently does so for the benefit of the client. Any task assigned to a nonlawyer
Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN.
L. REv. 1115, 1146-49 (2000) (noting and critiquing the argument that nonlawyers are less
qualified than lawyers, but acknowledging some settings where it holds true); Judith L. Maute,
Pre-Paid and Group Legal Services: Thirty Years After the Storm, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 915,
929 (2001) (labeling the unauthorized-practice doctrine "prophylactic").
121. Green, supra note 120, at 1146; Hurder, supra note 4, at 2264-66 (noting the breadth of
the unauthorized-practice restrictions and proposing more tailored regulation); Margulies, supra
note 7, at 288.
122. See WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 833-34; Rhode, Professionalism, supra note 6, at 711-
12.
123. Cf Nathan M. Crystal, Core Values: False and True, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 747,764-65
(2001) (noting that the ABA has ignored the suggestions of its Commission on Nonlawyer
Practice that recommend allowing delivery of legal services from other sources); Deborah
Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-lawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETincs 209, 232-33
(1990).
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assistant could, of course, be performed by the lawyer, but at a higher price. The use of
nonlawyers provides a more efficient delivery of legal services at a lower price than if
the lawyer acted alone;' 24 the resort to the use of nonlawyer services is thus financially
adverse to the lawyer's interests, at least most of the time. 125 A client might prefer that
arrangement for the same reasons that a client might prefer to hire a lay advocate
instead of a lawyer in order to save money;' 26 in this instance, contrary to the request
for a lay advocate, the law permits a client to make that choice, because the client has a
lawyer available to monitor the work. The lawyer will only choose to employ the
nonlawyer assistance when it makes sense for the client's case, given the client's
economic needs and the client's risk aversion.127 A client will only agree to nonlawyer
assistance when he trusts the lawyer's judgment, accepts the risk, and welcomes the
cost savings. The unauthorized-practice dogma has no complaint, both because the
nonlawyer's work will be evaluated and monitored in accordance with the lawyer's
124. Of course, a lawyer cannot charge a client her hourly rate for work performed by a
nonlawyer (although some have been caught doing so). For articles dealing with deception in
billing practices generally, see Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 659 (1990);
Douglas R. Richmond, For a Few Dollars More: The Perplexing Problems of Unethical Billing
Practices by Lawsyers, 60 S.C. L. REv. 63 (2008); William G. Ross, TheEthics ofHourly Billing
by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1991).
125. If the supply of lawyers' services is elastic and relatively unlimited, then a law firm
would prefer to earn higher fees by using a lawyer instead of a nonlawyer for any given task. In
practice, though, lawyer supply is not necessarily elastic at any given moment. A lawyer's
personal time is, of course, finite, so it might be in the lawyer's interest to delegate tasks to a
nonlawyer assistant to free the lawyer to earn more money working for a different client. For a
discussion of the elasticity/inelasticity of legal services within law firms, see, for example, Marc
Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second Transformation of the Big
Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1875-77 (2008) (describing newly developing "elastic"
techniques within law firms to maximize profit); Amelia J. Uelman, The Evils of "Elasticity":
Reflections on the Rhetoric of Professionalism and the Part-Time Paradox in Large Firm
Practice, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 81, 98-103 (2005) (describing how law firms arrange coverage
to accommodate fluctuating demand); William Kummel, Note, A Market Approach to Law Firm
Economics: A New Model for Pricing, Billing, Compensation and Ownership in Corporate
Legal Services, 1996 CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 379, 382-93 (1996) (analyzing and critiquing law
firm productivity and resource allocation).
126. See Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly, supra note 5, at 88.
127. In addition to the inelasticity issue, see supra note 125, a lawyer may benefit financially
by her use of the nonlawyer's assistance if she is offering services at a flat rate and not through a
billable-hour arrangement. For a sampling of the critique of hourly billing, see, for example,
Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby: Empirical Data on the Problems andPressure
Points, 33 FORDHAM URa. L.J. 171 (2005); Lawrence J. Fox, End Billable Hour Goals... Now,
17 No. 3 PROF. LAW. 1 (2006); Lerman, supra note 124, at 713-14; Richmond, supra note 124,
at 91-93; Ross, supra note 124, at 78-83. In those settings, the lawyer and her firm benefit if
much of the work is performed by lower-priced nonlawyers. That apparent conflict of interest is
mitigated by two factors, however. First, a lawyer ought to obtain the informed consent of the
client before delegating any substantial tasks to a nonlawyer. See BINDER Er AL., supra note 104,
at 275-80 (arguing that clients control all substantive decisions in the representation); Spiegel,
supra note 112, at 43 (same). Second, because the lawyer remains responsible for the ultimate
product and must achieve competent work, the lawyer has little incentive to exploit any seeming
conflict by employing shoddy, cheap labor.
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professional judgment (which the dogma trusts), and because the scheme does not
present anticompetitive threats to the legal profession.
I thus envision the following confluence: A lawyer who, against her economic
interests perhaps, opts to generate a more efficient work product by the judicious
delegation of tasks to a competent nonlawyer; and a client who, understanding the
fiduciary responsibility of his lawyer to protect his interests and desirous to obtain the
most inexpensive responsible legal services from the lawyer and her firm, accepts his
lawyer's delegation of tasks to the supervised nonlawyer; and the legal profession
which, trusting the lawyer's judgment and foreseeing little anticompetitive threat from
the use of nonlawyers, sees no basis to ban the concept of delegation. Those collective
actors with those overlapping interests ought to support a lawyer's delegation authority
and discretion. Those actors would be challenged to justify a categorical ban
preventing a lawyer from choosing to delegate certain selected tasks to nonlawyer
assistants.
2. A Taxonomy: Drafting, Legal Research, Fact Investigation, Legal Counseling
A nonlawyer employed by a lawyer to assist in her practice performs important
tasks which the lawyer, because of her delegation to the nonlawyer, will not perform
herself. I refer to the tasks as important because they are essentially that-without
those tasks, the lawyering would not achieve its ends, or would be incomplete.
128
Someone must perform those tasks; in the settings we are exploring, it is the
nonlawyer, and not the lawyer, who performs them. The lawyer, of course, must
supervise the performance of the tasks by the nonlawyer, but supervision cannot mean,
and does not mean, that the lawyer must accompany the nonlawyer and observe his
performance of the tasks. No reasonable understanding of supervision contemplates
such close monitoring, and any such proposal would be an absurd understanding of the
use of legal assistants. Nor must the lawyer repeat the work of the nonlawyer to ensure
its accuracy or soundness, for the same obvious reasons.
Supervision, then, will mean something different from constant monitoring or
replicating the nonlawyer's work. If supervision has any substantive meaning, it must
mean that the lawyer, who is the only person on the team who may orchestrate the
lawyering work in its final form, must be confident, within the realm of reason, 129 that
the nonlawyer has gotten the task right.130 Consider four examples of tasks which a
128. See, e.g., Pincayv. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 856 (9thCir. 2004) ("[Tjhe delegation of
[attending to court deadlines] to specialized, well-educated non-lawyers may well ensure greater
accuracy in meeting deadlines than a practice of having each lawyer in a large firm calculate
each filing deadline anew.").
129. The use of nonlawyers within law firms invites inevitable risk, risk that the practice
schemes accept as a worthwhile compromise, if only because of the cost effectiveness of using
nonlawyers instead of lawyers for certain tasks. See, e.g., In re Opinion No. 24 of Comm. on
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 607 A.2d 962, 966-68 (N.J. 1992) (noting the importance of
paralegal use in saving clients money).
130. See Chavkin, supra note 18, at 1543 (a clinical supervisor's role is to prepare students
to respond responsibly to fluid events); Ann Shalleck, Clinical Contexts: Theory and Practice in
Law and Supervision, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 109, 147 (1994) ("In supervision the
teacher can ... assess the students' ability to draw upon the concepts they have learned and act
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lawyer might choose to delegate to a nonlawyer: drafting documents; performing legal
research; performing factual research; and advising clients about the state of the law
and the options available to them. As we have seen above,' 31 the advisory authority
regularly permits a lawyer's delegation of the first three of these, but often prohibits a
lawyer from delegating the fourth, the offering of legal advice. A comparison of these
four tasks will help us to understand the function and the limitations of the concept of
"supervision." It will also show us that acceptance of the propriety of the first three
activities' delegation requires acceptance of the propriety of the last activity's
delegation.
a. Document Drafting
The first example-drafting a legal document such as a pleading-might serve as an
easy beginning example. It is a task categorically permitted to be delegated to a
nonlawyer by virtually all authorities, 32 and its acceptability may be understood by
reference to the risk-assessment heuristic. Consider a lawyer who delegates to a
nonlawyer the task of drafting a standard motion using templates available within the
law firm. The lawyer will be able to evaluate with a high degree of confidence whether
the resulting product reads properly and includes the language, the clarity, and the
elements necessary for the motion to achieve its purpose. The lawyer likely saves time
by delegating the task to a nonlawyer, but the quality of the resulting work may be
perfectly evaluated by the lawyer. The risk management by the lawyer is cabined and
easily assessed.
For other documents, however, the risks of delegation may be more pronounced or
unclear. A lawyer who delegates to a nonlawyer the task of choosing from among a
selection of sample templates, or perhaps to create a first draft of a pleading without
employing any template, may not be able to assess with the same level of confidence
whether the resulting document achieves its purpose as well as if the lawyer had
drafted the pleading herself. Nevertheless, some lawyers might ask a nonlawyer to
create such a document in an exercise of her lawyering judgment, to save time for the
lawyer and money for the client. The lawyer will accept some small possibility that the
resulting work will fail to achieve its purposes, but that risk assumption is an ongoing
enterprise for the lawyer.'
33
in light of their understanding.").
131. See supra notes 40-97 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., CONN. BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LAWYERS WHO EMPLOY OR RETAiN LEGAL
ASSISTANTS Guideline 2 (1997), http://www.ctbar.org/article/view/197/1/57 [hereinafter CONN.
BAR GUIDELINES] ("drafting legal documents" permitted); ETHics ADVISORY COMM., S.C. BAR,
Ermcs ADVISORY OPINION 02-12 (2002) ("composition of legal documents"); Utah State Bar
Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., Opinion No. 99-02 (1999) ('[Nonlawyers] may perform a
wide array of services, including... drafting documents or pleadings.") [hereinafter Utah Ethics
Op. No. 99-02]. No court has ever suggested that nonlawyers may not draft documents, except
when the drafting occurs without lawyer oversight. See, e.g., United States v. Hardy, 681 F.
Supp. 1326, 1328-29 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (concluding that drafting simple documents that require
some degree of legal knowledge is practice of law); Lynch v. Cannatella, 122 F.R.D. 195, 198-
99 (E.D. La. 1987) (holding that an attorney could not allow a legal secretary to prepare, sign,
and file an amended complaint, aff'd, 860 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1988).
133. Drafting tasks are the easiest assignments to justify using the risk assessment
benchmark, because the lawyer supervising the assignment sees the complete product generated
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b. Legal Research
Contrast the pleading-drafting task with the next example-performing legal
research, another task categorically permitted by the advisory authorities. 134 For legal
research, the lawyer's confidence in the resulting work product may be high (the results
can fit comfortably within the lawyer's understanding of the substantive law as she has
understood it), but it simply cannot be as high as in the first motion example above. If
the lawyer's case requires legal research, a task for which the client will be charged and
which the lawyering responsibilities require, the necessary assumption is that the
lawyer does not know for sure what the law is without looking it up. Few lawyers know
the law perfectly without looking it up, and, for those few lawyers, their knowledge is
likely limited to narrow and frequently repeated contexts.1 35 When a nonlawyer
performs legal research, then, the supervision by the lawyer means that the lawyer uses
her best legal judgment-the legal judgment she has acquired by her membership in
the profession and her practice experience-that the results of the research, as reported
by the nonlawyer, are sufficiently reliable that the lawyer may use the results in moving
ahead with her strategic development, advocacy, and negotiation. Like with the
drafting task, the ultimate question for the lawyer is whether the quality of the work
product is sufficiently high to permit her to use it in her ongoing work.
c. Fact Investigation
The next example-factual research-demonstrates a potentially higher level of
risk, but risk whose magnitude the lawyer might reasonably assess and account for in
her work. Once again, performing fact investigation and interviewing clients are
responsibilities regularly understood as permissible activities for a lawyer to delegate
by the nonlawyer. The risks still exist, though, in at least two ways. First, by not drafting the
pleading herself, the lawyer's thought process has changed, and she may miss in reviewing a
completed document some considerations she would have discerned if she engaged in the
creative drafting herself. Scholars have noted that writing is a form of thinking. See Linda L.
Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of Reader and Writer,
Text and Context, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155, 155 (1999) ("[W]riting is a process for constructing
thought."); Philip C. Kissam, Thinking (By Writing) About Legal Writing, 40 VAND. L. REv.
135, 140 (1987) ("[T]he writing process ... alters and enriches the nature of legal thought."); J.
Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 WASH. L. REv. 35,
45 (1994) ("[W]riting is an integral part of thinking and cognitive development."). Second,
drafting is essentially entwined with legal research; the drafter creates with a legal theory in
mind and ensures that the pleading sufficiently satisfies the elements of that theory. See
MARILYN J. BERGER, JOHN B. MITCHELL & RONALD H. CLARK, PRETRIAL ADVOCACY: PLANNING,
ANALYSIS, AND STRATEGY 161 (2007) (labeling "strategic pleading" as a "goal-oriented
approach"). Since legal research is a riskier endeavor, see infra,Part lII.C.2.c, drafting shares
some of the peril accompanying the delegation of research.
134. See, e.g., In re Easler, 272 S.E.2d 32, 32 (1980) ("legal research" permitted); Utah
Ethics Op. No. 99-02, supra note 132 (stating that "[nonlawyers] may perform a wide array of
services, including ... conducting legal research").
135. Some lawyers qualify as legal specialists, usually under a state-certification scheme. For
a discussion of the specialization issue, see RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 5, at 682-87; see also
Peel v. Att'y Registration & Disciplinary Comm., 496 U.S. 91, 110-11 (1990) (holding that a
lawyer had a First Amendment right to advertise as a specialist).
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to her nonlawyer colleagues. 136 For fact investigation, the lawyer's confidence in the
resulting product must necessarily be less than in either of the first two examples.
While some of the nonlawyer's factual research may produce uncontrovertibly reliable
results-a witness statement notarized by the witness, for instance, or a certified copy
of a publicly recorded document137-not all factual research permitted to be performed
by nonlawyers would satisfy that description. The lawyer might reasonably rely, using
her legal and professional judgment, on the reports of her investigators and other
nonlawyer staff about events, accounts, observations, medical histories, and the like,
when she develops her strategy and completes her final lawyering activity.
138
Like with each example discussed, the lawyer's performance herself of the tasks
would decrease the risk of distortion or error or sloppiness, but her performance would
increase, perhaps dramatically, the cost of her services. The lawyer, her clients, and the
legal profession have opted to accept this minimal additional risk in return for the
benefits of cost saving and efficiency. They do so, it is safe to assume, because the
resulting risk from the delegation is extremely small due to the oversight and
supervision of the experienced lawyer with judgment to guide her assessments. 139
136. See, e.g., In re Easier, 272 S.E.2d at 32; ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 85 (1935). Indeed, some texts train nonlawyers how to engage in
fact investigation. See, e.g., ELLEN J. WOLTER, FACTFINDING ON A SHOESTRING FOR THE
PARALEGAL: INEXPENSIVE TECHNIQUES FOR GATHERING INFORMATION (1996).
137. Even in these most safe examples, the lawyer's delegation of a task to a nonlawyer
involves an added element of risk, since the lawyer has not obtained the resulting papers herself.
The nonlawyer may have forged the witness document, or the witness may not be who he claims
to be. Such risks are extremely unlikely, of course, but nevertheless represent an inevitable
element of delegation, and that, indeed, is the point of this entire discussion.
138. A lawyer who understands that she has authority to assign, say, a document-preparation
task to a nonlawyer must nevertheless exercise judgment and discretion about what documents
to assign the nonlawyer to prepare, given the importance, complexity, and subtlety of the
document and the skill and experience of the nonlawyer. So, for example, a lawyer may ask an
experienced real estate paralegal to prepare a HUD-1 settlement statement as part of an
uncomplicated residential real estate closing, understanding that the experienced paralegal is
very likely to fill the form out correctly. See, e.g., Comms. of the Fla. Bar, Annual Reports, Fla.
B.J., June 2006, at 30, 58 ("[M]any real estate practitioners rely on paralegals and computer
software to complete certain real estate documents and settlement statements."). The same
lawyer ought not, and would not, ask a volunteer college-student intern to draft a Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court on a deeply complicated antitrust dispute.
The concept of "document preparation," therefore, does not offer any helpful answer to the
question about the propriety of assignment of tasks to a nonlawyer. The only true consideration
is an assessment of the risks and benefits to the client of the assignment and the combined
likelihood of the nonlawyer being wrong and the case or matter suffering as a result.
139. Note that this understanding of the use of nonlawyers as a risk-management device is
not only applicable to the lawyer's delegation choices. The same kind of risk/benefit assessment
occurs on a daily basis within the lawyer's own work and her own practice. Even without using
assistants, at some point in her work, the lawyer finds herself satisfied that she has completed
enough factual and legal research, enough redrafting of documents, and enough consulting with
experts, to proceed to a final product for her client. She always could spend more time at greater
cost to the client, but she exercises her judgments about when to stop. That same set of
heuristics operates in her assessment of the reliability of her assistants' contributions.
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In each of the examples described (drafting, legal research, and fact investigation),
the nonlawyer's work couldpossibly be wrong. The nonlawyer's drafting of a motion
might omit a critical element of the motion's argument, leaving it fatally flawed.' 40 The
nonlawyer's legal research could overlook a critical new development eviscerating the
strength of the authorities located and reported to the lawyer. The nonlawyer's factual
research might be sloppy, incomplete, or distorted for any number of reasons.14 1 Of
course, a lawyer's performance of any of those very same tasks could also be wrong,
although the odds of that happening are seemingly lower than in the case of the
nonlawyer's work, especially if we accept (as we do for the sake of this Article) the
premises of the unauthorized-practice dogma.142 The lawyer's supervision of the
nonlawyer's work decreases the risk of error, but it cannot eliminate it.
Clients, though, should, and in fact do, accept the just-described use ofnonlawyers
as a reasonable trade-off that will reduce the cost of legal services with minimal effect
on the quality of the services rendered. In assessing the wisdom of a lawyer's use of
nonlawyer services to assist in her work for clients, that matrix is the ultimate standard
by which the profession ought to evaluate this scheme: Is a client sufficiently protected
by the lawyer's delegation of some tasks to others? Put another way, should the
profession permit a client to elect to retain a lawyer who will delegate some of her
tasks to supervised nonlawyers? So long as the lawyer, exercising her judgment about
the complicated practice world in which she operates and accepting the ultimate
responsibility for the results of the risks involved, concludes that the work performed
by the nonlawyer is reasonably close to what the lawyer would achieve at a
significantly higher cost to the client, then the profession ought to permit an informed
client to accept those minimal risks. It is, in other words, a sensible thing for the
profession to allow and for an informed and understanding client to choose. 
143
140. It is a tricky analytical question-but perhaps an irrelevant one for our purposes-
whether the faulty motion ought to be considered a drafting error or a legal research error. We
noted above that the lawyer reviewing the final product of the motion should recognize drafting
mistakes, but may not recognize research errors, if the reason for the research in the first place
was the lawyer's need to learn some part of the law that she did not already know by rote
memory.
141. The behavioral economists teach us that observations and understandings are seldom
"objective" and value neutral. Individuals are subject to a wide range of biases and "cognitive
illusions" that distort their perceptions. See, e.g., ARIELY, supra note 108; MAX H. BAZERMAN,
JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING (6th ed. 2006). Because lawyers are equally
subject to the same cognitive processes and biases, it is an intriguing question whether a lawyer
would be more or less capable of approaching an "objective," undistorted understanding of
factual issues compared to a lawyer's assistant. See, e.g., Linda Babcock, Henry S. Farber,
Cynthia Fobia & Eldar Shafir, Forming Beliefs About Adjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions of
Risk and Reservation Values, 15 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 289, 293-94 (1995) (stating that
negotiators reach very different assessments about the value of a case when given identical
information); Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Creating
Convergence: Debiasing BiasedLitigants, 22 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 913 (1997) (showing plausible
debiasing efforts).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 4-9.
143. Note here an apparent underlying construct-that a client could choose, and a lawyer
seemingly would be bound by that choice, to pay a lawyer her higher billing rate to perform all
of the tasks the lawyer might otherwise delegate to a nonlawyer. This construct treats the use of
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d. Legal Advising and Counseling-A Categorical Exclusion?
We now reach our fourth example, that of providing legal advice to a client, the
assignment most frequently identified by the advisory authorities as nondelegable.' 44 If
the advisory authorities' description of the lawyer's duties is accurate, and if we accept
a literal and not a nuanced interpretation of that description, then lawyers possess no
discretion to delegate to a nonlawyer the task of providing to a client some legal
advice, while possessing lawful discretion to delegate to the nonlawyer the
responsibilities of drafting documents, performing legal research, and conducting fact
investigation. We saw above that the literal reading of that prohibition was not
supported by any fair interpretation of available substantive law. 45 We see here why
such a literal reading would be incoherent. Applying the same matrix of risk
management, informed consent, and unauthorized-practice prophylaxis, we see lawyers
must possess the same discretion to delegate to a supervised nonlawyer the assignment
of providing some legal advice.
Lawyers who assign document-preparation, legal-research, and fact-investigation
tasks to nonlawyers risk malpractice liability or other adverse consequences if the
nonlawyers perform the tasks incompetently. 146 Because any performer of legal
services, lawyer or nonlawyer, risks committing malpractice if her work happens to be
sloppy or in error, the question for the lawyer remains one of assessing the acceptable
level of risk, and accepting responsibility to indemnify the harmed client if errors occur
and result in malpractice damages.1
47
The difficulty with applying a categorical test that would bar lawyers from
delegating to a nonlawyer discrete lawyering activities like "counseling" is apparent.
The underlying justifications for use of nonlawyers as part of an efficient, client-
a nonlawyer assistant as a lawyering option for which the client must provide informed consent.
While that construct makes powerful sense conceptually, see, e.g., BINDER ET AL., supra note
104, at 296 (describing an orientation in which most substantive decisions remain for the client
to decide), it does not appear in the literature addressing the professional ethics of legal
assistants or of lawyers using legal assistants, see, e.g., MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE UTILIZATION
OF PARALEGAL SERVS. (2004) (giving no suggestion of informed consent to use of nonlawyer);
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2009).
144. See, e.g., Doe v. Condon, 532 S.E.2d 879, 883 (S.C. 2000) ("[A]nswering legal
questions would constitute the unauthorized practice of law."); NALA CODE OF ETHICS, supra
note 11, at Canon 3 ("A paralegal must not... give legal opinions or advice."); S.C. Bar Ethics
Adv. Comm., Op. 02-12 (2002) (stating that it is "well settled that a paralegal may not give legal
advice"); CONN. BAR GUIDELINES, supra note 132 (stating that "legal advice may not be given"
during client interviews); cf MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE UTILIZATION OF PARALEGAL SERVS.
Guideline 3(C) (2004) (stating that a nonlawyer must not accept "responsibility for a legal
opinion rendered to a client").
145. See supra notes 40-97 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., VLT, Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 54 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1319 (D. Mass.
2003) (paralegal's mistake waives privilege); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190
F.R.D. 287 (D. Mass. 2000) (same); Christine Beck Lissitzyn, What's in a Name? Should
Paralegals Be Liable for Legal Malpractice?, 77 CONN. B.J. 86 (2003), reprinted in PROF.
LAW., March 2005, at 2, 12-14 (2005) (describing when the lawyer, and when the nonlawyer,
would be liable for malpractice damages to an injured client).
147. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERS § 49 (2002); Lissitzyn,
supra note 146, at 97; WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 206-26.
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centered law practice apply equally as well to some forms of counseling as they do to
some forms of document preparation, legal research, or fact development. To
understand why, we return to the concept of supervision. All nonlawyer work must be
properly supervised, whatever its nature. 148 The critical question is what constitutes
effective supervision.
49
As noted above, 150 supervision of a subordinate, whether a lawyer or a nonlawyer,
does not mean that the supervising lawyer must observe every action the supervisee
takes.151 It does not mean that the supervising lawyer must reprise the work performed
by the supervisee to ensure its accuracy.15 2 Instead, a practical understanding of
supervision shows it to consist of measures by the lawyer which offer assurance that
the delegated work will be performed competently. 53 It is a risk-management
concept-it cannot guarantee competent service any more than the lawyer's doing the
work herself could guarantee that result.
54
A lawyer may delegate to a nonlawyer the responsibility to communicate legal
advice to a client in the same manner, and employing the same risk-management and
supervision skills, as the lawyer would delegate a legal research or document-drafting
task. A lawyer who knows that her nonlawyer colleague-assume, for the moment, an
experienced lateral who is not a member ofthe bar and is not practicing "temporarily"
in the state 55 -understands a client's legal issues with depth and sophistication and
148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 (2002).
149. Supervision is central to the role of clinical legal education and has received much
attention in that realm. See, e.g., Gerald J. Clark, Supervising Judicial Interns: A Primer, 36
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 681 (2003); Gundlach, supra note 17; Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Donald
Schtn, The Reflective Practitioner, and the Comparative Failures of Legal Education, 6
CLINICAL L. REV. 401,414 (2000); William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teaching for
the New Clinical Law Professor: A View from the First Floor, 28 AKRON L. REV. 463,477-81
(1995).
150. See supra text accompanying note 129-30.
151. The cases where a court determines that delegation was proper tend to involve fee
disputes, where the quality of the lawyering product tends not to be an issue. See, e.g., Missouri
v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 286-89 (1989) (describing an unsuccessful challenge to compensation
for paralegals); In re Jastrem, 224 B.R. 125, 131 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1998) (finding the paralegal
fees appropriate); see also In re Opinion No. 24 of the Comm. on the Unauthorized Practice of
Law, 607 A.2d 962, 966 (N.J. 1992) (acknowledging the many proper tasks for nonlawyer
assistance to lawyers).
152. In re Opinion No. 24, 607 A.2d, at 969 (affirming practice of using "independent
paralegals" not employed by a law firm); MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE UTILIZATION OF
PARALEGAL SERVS. Guideline 2 cmt. (2004) (stating that a lawyer must provide adequate
instruction and monitor progress).
153. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.05(1) cmt. d (2006). A principal is liable if
an agent is not adequately supervised. Id. Supervision includes "reasonable mechanisms to
assure compliance with instructions." Id.
154. I use the term "guarantee" to mean that the lawyer can be absolutely certain that no
mistakes will be made. If we understood "guarantee" to mean an indemnification or
compensation if the resulting work is not competent, then in both scenarios the lawyer would
"guarantee" the result.
155. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c)(1) cmrts. 6, 8 (2009) (permitting an
out-of-state lawyer to practice in the jurisdiction temporarily if associated with a lawyer who is
licensed).
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can discuss those issues with clarity and nuance can, consistent with the lawyer's
fiduciary duties to her client, suggest that the nonlawyer meet with the client and advise
the client about his rights. That delegation would be an essential part of the lawyer's
representation of the client, for which the lawyer would remain ultimately responsible.
The client would understand that the advice has been communicated by a nonlawyer
and by implication (or perhaps expressly so) would consent to the use of a less-
expensive device to further the client's case. 56 No worry about unauthorized practice
of law arises, both because the client is the beneficiary of the purported special skill of
the lawyer15 and because the nonlawyer presents no threat to the lawyer's livelihood,
since the lawyer has full control over the use of that practice option.
5 8
Recall that a nuanced reading of the apparent categorical ban on nonlawyers
offering legal advice supports this conclusion. 5 9 The authorities which repeat that
generalized prohibition often qualify it with some version of the "conduit" notion,16
0
approving a nonlawyer's communication to the client of the lawyer's ideas. 61 It is
critical, however, not to read the conduit conception in too crabbed and narrow a
fashion. The narrow conduit version would approve a nonlawyer's providing legal
advice only as a script reader, one who has heard the lawyer's legal conclusions and
transmits those ideas to the client by rote. By that understanding, a reasonably talented
high-school intern could accomplish that task.
A more sensible, and in fact the only sensible, understanding of the conduit idea
goes much farther than the script-reading function. The better understanding approves
of the nonlawyer's engaging the client in a spirited dialogue about the client's legal
rights and duties, so long as the lawyer is confident that the nonlawyer may perform
that task competently and effectively.1 62 The assistant still serves as a "conduit" for the
lawyer's judgment and for the lawyer's skill at reading complexity and nuance.
Because the lawyer is certain that the nonlawyer has the ability to manage the
interaction, that judgment (and that risk assessment) controls. The lawyer is using the
nonlawyer as one useful component of her lawyering "toolkit."'
' 63
156. See supra text accompanying notes 109-13 (discussing the informed consent
component of the conceptual framework).
157. See CRYSTAL, supra note 96, at 480 (noting the professed underpinning of
unauthorized-practice rules as protecting clients by assuring the presence of a lawyer).
158. See RHODE, supra note 3, at 83 (noting the importance of that threat to the
unauthorized-practice dogma).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 40-95.
160. See HPD Labs., Inc. v. Clorox Co., 202 F.R.D. 410,415 (D.N.J. 2001) (approving the
conduit metaphor); John Labatt Ltd. v. Molson Breweries, 898 F. Supp. 471,477 (E.D. Mich.
1995) (same); Fl. Bar v. Beach, 675 So. 2d 106, 109 (Fla. 1996) (finding that a nonlawyer acted
as a "conduit" for the lawyer, without supervision, and suspending the lawyer).
161. See, e.g., N.H. SuP. CT. R. 35 ("[W]ith adequate lawyer supervision the legal assistant
may provide information concerning legal matters."); MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE UTIUIZATION
OF PARALEGAL SERvs. Guideline 2 cmt. (2004).
162. See Chavkin,supra note 18, at 1512. While Chavkin applies his arguments to students
who are provisionally licensed to practice law under a state's student practice rule, his insights
have relevance to nonlawyers to whom lawyers delegate tasks as part of the lawyers' practice.
See Bryant & Milstein, supra note 107, at 208-09 (noting the importance of students' abilities
to exercise judgment amidst uncertainty).
163. Cf Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, the Law ofNations, and Citations of Foreign
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This richer conduit conception, however, suggests some possible limits. Its trusting
ofthe lawyer's assessment about the nonlawyer's skill might imply more liberty on the
part of the lawyer than even an expansive reading of the unauthorized-practice-of-law
dogma would tolerate. For instance, a lawyer might accurately trust her nonlawyer
colleague's abilities so much (imagine, again, an experienced lateral associate) that the
lawyer would confidently choose to assign the nonlawyer to handle a client's matter
from beginning to end without any oversight by the lawyer at all-indeed, the lawyer
may never even know of the client's existence, except perhaps to approve formally the
creation of an attorney-client relationship with the law firm.164 By all of the criteria we
have employed above-the risk-management responsibilities of the lawyer, the
informed consent of the client (who, we may assume, has assented to the nonlawyer's
role), and the unauthorized-practice prophylaxis-that arrangement should pass
muster. Given the lawyer's ultimate responsibility and her judgment about the depth
and breadth of the nonlawyer's talent, there is no conceptual difference between that
delegation and the lawyer's assigning the nonlawyer to draft a pleading. Nevertheless,
despite the logic of this proposition, a lawyer using her nonlawyer assistant in this way
proceeds at her own peril. 165 The critical problem with this setting is that the lawyer has
not supervised the matters on which the nonlawyer has worked. Mere confidence in the
talents of the nonlawyer would not suffice; the lawyer must oversee the actual work of
the nonlawyer. 166
Law: The Lessons of History, 95 CAL. L. REv. 1335, 1347-48 (2007) ("[F]oreign and
international law" serve as "part of the lawyer's toolkit."); David McGowan, Politics, Office
Politics, and Legal Ethics: A Case Study in the Strategy ofJudgment, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1057, 1093 (2007) ("[R]ational actor game-theoretic analysis.., is fundamental to a lawyer's
analytical toolkit.").
164. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 (2002); supra text
accompanying notes 109-17 (discussing this concept).
165. Cf. State v. Foster, 674 So. 2d 747, 754 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). In Foster, an
independent paralegal conducted depositions without the supervision from or association with
an attorney. In affirming a finding of unauthorized practice of law, the court held "that the non-
lawyer appellees' active participation in questioning witnesses in depositions, without the
presence and immediate guidance and supervision of a licensed practitioner... constitutes the
unauthorized practice of law." Id. at 753. In response to a motion to clarify its opinion, the court
amended the preceding language to bar deposition questioning by nonlawyers "even under the
immediate guidance and supervision of a licensed attorney." Id. at 754 (emphasis added).
That amended language in Foster, if it happened to constitute the substantive law in Florida
(which it seemingly does not, as it was simply dictum in the matter before the court), would
undercut the broad conduit concept developed in the text. Besides its status as dictum, though,
the court's proposition is of more limited value because of the close relationship between
depositions and court testimony. This Article has acknowledged from the beginning that
nonlawyers cannot participate in court proceedings. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
A deposition is, in many substantive respects, a preliminary version of court testimony. See FED.
R. CIv. P. 30, 32 (preserving objections during depositions); FED. R. EVIm. 804(b)(1) (using
depositions at trial); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 1 (2004) (including a
deposition as a proceeding before a "tribunal" for purposes of the rule prohibiting false
statements made to a tribunal).
166. Cf AUTHORIZED PRACTICE COMM,, N.C. STATE BAR, GUIDELINES FOR ATrORNEYS
LICENSED IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 1 (2003) ("'Appropriate supervision' means the necessary
and adequate training, instruction, and oversight of the activities of an unlicensed attorney.").
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Thus, a categorical exclusion of "counseling" or "advice giving" from the activities
permitted to be delegated to a nonlawyer would be hard to defend and difficult to
apply. The only conceivable justification for categorical treatment of that activity
would be a purely prophylactic one. A creator of guidelines governing nonlawyer
practice supervised by a lawyer might claim that the risks of harm to a client are so
great from a nonlawyer's advice giving that even a wise and experienced lawyer ought
never be permitted to delegate a counseling activity to a nonlawyer colleague,
regardless of the comfort level of the lawyer with the nature of the task and the
qualifications of the nonlawyer. That argument, though, is a remarkably weak one. Risk
abounds in assigning any task to a nonlawyer, just as risks abound (albeit presumably
lower ones overall) in the lawyer's doing the work herself. Some advice-giving tasks
will objectively carry far less risk than some legal-research tasks. The guideline
creator's prophylactic arguments would perhaps support a categorical ban on the use of
legal assistants entirely, but not to carve out categorical distinctions within the panoply
of activities that a lawyer engages in while representing a client.
Similar arguments would apply to any attempt at a categorical exclusion of
"negotiation" from the acceptable roles of nonlawyers in law firms. 167 The concept of
negotiation tends to refer to activity involving the resolution of differences through
bargaining and compromise in an effort to come to a settlement of a dispute or to
complete a transaction. 68 Assuming for the sake of this argument that negotiation can,
if performed within a legal setting, represent the practice of law that nonlawyers may
not pursue,169 a lawyer may nevertheless delegate to a nonlawyer assistant certain parts
of the negotiation process with proper supervision and with the lawyer's acceptance of
responsibility for the activity. Such delegation, of course, would include negotiation
meetings occurring outside of the presence of the lawyer.
70
We might wonder whether negotiation ought to be seen as qualitatively different
from any of the previous categories, especially negotiation outside of the lawyer's
observation. A critic might think of that process as too inevitably intertwined with legal
167. For authority barring nonlawyers from engaging in negotiation, see STATE BAR OFN.M.,
supra note 70, at R. 20-103; supra note 71.
168. See RUSSELL KOROBKIN,NEGOTATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 1 (2002) ("Negotiation is
an interactive communication process by which two or more parties who lack identical interests
attempt to find a way to coordinate... in a way that will make them better off than they could
be if they were to act alone.").
169. It is readily apparent that other professionals besides lawyers engage in negotiation;
nevertheless, negotiation can be considered the practice of law when performed for a legal
purpose or as part of a lawyer's representation of a client. See In re Dwight, 573 P.2d 481,484
(Ariz. 1977) (holding that an attorney acting in his capacity as an investment advisor was
subject to ethical rules governing attorneys) ("As long as a lawyer is engaged in the practice of
law, he is bound by the ethical requirements of that profession, and he may not defend his
actions by contending that he was engaged in some other kind of professional activity."). If a
lawyer performing tasks open to nonlawyers is deemed to be practicing law, then a nonlawyer
working with the lawyer is likely bound by the same principle.
170. If the lawyer were present at the negotiating table while the nonlawyer communicated
with the other party to the negotiation, it is hard to understand that setting as a delegation of
duties to the nonlawyer at all. A more accurate description would be that the lawyer herself is
doing the negotiation, since she is present to intervene if the process is not unfolding as she
expected.
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judgment and deliberation such that a lawyer ought never-categorically-assign a
nonlawyer to perform that role. While that worry has some plausible merit, it cannot
justify a categorical ban on such delegation as a matter of professional ethics. As with
all of the previous topics, the assessment of the propriety of the assignment rests on the
lawyer's practical wisdom about the effectiveness of the nonlawyer's communication
and implementation of the lawyer's judgments. Without doubt, some complex
negotiations will never properly be assigned to a nonlawyer. But other less complex
bargaining events, such as telephone calls to communicate and defend an offer or
demand whose terms are easily understood by both parties, might sensibly and properly
be delegated to an assistant. The question will always remain one of the lawyer's
exercise of her professional judgment given the risks and benefits involved, with her
assurance of satisfactory supervision of the nonlawyer.
Any of the other categories where some authority has precluded assignments to a
nonlawyer may be understood using the same analysis. For instance, a nonlawyer could
not independently establish an attorney-client relationship with a client.1 71 Because
only a lawyer may represent a client, only a lawyer may create the relationship. But a
nonlawyer, as the lawyer's conduit, may communicate the lawyer's agreement to
accept an individual or an entity as a client. 172 Similarly, only the lawyer may decide to
terminate the relationship, but no authority would claim that the lawyer may not
delegate to a nonlawyer assistant the communication of the closing of a matter. That
kind of assistance is regularly accepted within the profession.
73
Therefore, once we exclude the distinctive context of the court appearance and
proceedings auxiliary to that setting, not one of the categorical limitations on
nonlawyer practice appearing in the literature is either accurate or valid. The only
categorical limitation on nonlawyer delegation is, essentially, the substantive law of
malpractice. 174
171. Not surprisingly, much advisory authority notes that limitation. See, e.g., MODEL
GUIDELINES FOR THfE UTILIZATION OF PARALEGAL SERVS. Guideline 3 cmt. (2004).
172. Cf DeVaux v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 444 N.E.2d 355,359 (Mass. 1983) (stating
that a secretary's actions created an attorney-client relationship by the client's reliance).
173. See, e.g., In re Marino, 229 N.E.2d 23 (N.Y. 1967) (holding that it is permissible for a
nonlawyer to communicate to a prospective client the lawyer's decision to decline a matter). The
decision to end the relationship may be a collaborative one, in which the lawyer relies upon the
insights of her knowledgeable assistant, so long as the triggering decision is made by the lawyer.
174. There are two ways to understand this categorical limitation. Its most obvious meaning
relates to baseline competence-that a lawyer must offer her client competent legal services, and
if delegation to a nonlawyer fails that standard, then the lawyer may not delegate. See MODEL
RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2004). But malpractice is also a relative, community-based
standard. A typical understanding of professional negligence in the legal profession is breach of
"that degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a
reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer in the practice of law in this jurisdiction." Cook,
Flanagan & Berst v. Clausing, 438 P.2d 865, 867 (Wash. 1968). The phrase "this jurisdiction"
means what it says--that the application of the standard of care depends on local practices. See
Kellos v. Sawilowsky, 325 S.E.2d 757, 758 (Ga. 1985) (referring to Georgia lawyers, not
lawyers nationally). Thus, if the practice standard in a jurisdiction includes acceptance of much
delegation to nonlawyers (and, it is fair to speculate, most local practices fit that description),
the malpractice standard identified in the text will take that into account.
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IV. APPLYING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEwORK TO THE ELSI STAFF
In this Part, I apply the framework to the story of the CED Project within Essex
Legal Services Institute (ELSI), the Massachusetts legal services office. 7 5 The ELSI
CED Project included one Massachusetts lawyer, Joe Bartholomew, whose familiarity
with community economic development law was limited; an out-of-state lawyer, Dara
Coletta, who knew national community economic development law extremely well
from her practice in California; two law students, David Dahlstrom, who was a
certified law student licensed to practice under the Massachusetts student-practice rule,
and Julie Lucia, who was not eligible to be certified under that rule; and a college
intern, Mike Newman, a sophomore at Tufts University. A crude understanding of the
nonlawyer practice guidelines would lead to the conclusion that any one of the
unlicensed persons could assist Bartholomew in some preparatory tasks, subject of
course to his supervision. A more contextual and refined understanding of the
guidelines will permit Bartholomew to assign work in a more principled fashion. Let us
review the opportunities available for each member of the team in light of the
framework developed above.
A. Joe Bartholomew, the Lawyer
Bartholomew is a lawyer licensed in Massachusetts, so his is the easiest example.
Bartholomew may provide all of the legal services to the client MCDC, 7 6 but he must
be sure that he is competent to do so. As a long-time litigator, Bartholomew is not yet
familiar with many of the laws, schemes, practices, and regulations surrounding
affordable housing development and real estate closings. He may still represent
MCDC, subject to his client's informed consent,177 if he is capable of achieving the
necessary competence through study' 78 or "through the association of a lawyer of
established competence in the field in question."
17 9
175. For the CED Project description, see supra Part I.
176. See supra text accompanying note 35.
177. A client should understand the competence level of his lawyer, and should provide
informed consent if the lawyer's expertise is still developing. See RESTATEMENT (THiRD)OFTHE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 cmt. d (2002) (noting that a client might choose to hire a lawyer
without expertise); Alexis Anderson, Arlene Kanter & Cindy Slane, Ethics in Externships:
Confidentiality, Conflicts, and Competence Issues in the Field and in the Classroom, 10
CLINICAL L. REV. 473, 536 (2004) (discussing law student competence); Christopher Sabis &
Daniel Webert, Understanding the "Knowledge" Requirement of Attorney Competence: A
Roadmap for Novice Attorneys, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 915, 927 (2002) (noting the
importance of a client's understanding of his lawyer's competence).
178. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 2 (2009) ("A lawyer can provide
adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study."). While the ELSI story
takes place in Massachusetts, I will refer to the ABA Model Rules instead of the Massachusetts
version of those rules in order to maintain consistency with the analyses from earlier parts of this
Article. The Massachusetts rules would not differ in any substantive way from the Model Rules.
Because ELSI does not charge its clients, Bartholomew does not confront the complicated
question of whether he can charge his clients for the time he needs to achieve competence. See
In re Fordham, 668 N.E.2d 816, 822 (Mass. 1996) (suspending an experienced lawyer who
charged excessive fees while preparing a novel type of case); Robert L. Wheeler, Inc. v. Scott,
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Bartholomew's role in the CED Project does raise two questions. First, may he
obtain his competence by associating with Dara Coletta, the unlicensed lawyer from
California who knows the community economic development law extremely well? And
second, as a novice at the new transactional work of the CED project, might he
nevertheless supervise nonlawyers and assign them tasks? The response to both
questions is yes.
ABA Model Rule 1.1 permits Bartholomew to become competent "through
necessary study . . . [and] through the association of a lawyer of established
competence in the field in question."' 80 His intention at ELSI is to become competent
by associating with Coletta, the expert from California, and learning from her. If we
assume for the moment that Coletta possesses the expertise to understand the federal
affordable-housing schemes as they operate in Massachusetts, 18 1 Bartholomew may use
her as his source of education. If she is not qualified as a "lawyer" with whom
Bartholomew has "associate[d]," she still qualifies as a resource for Bartholomew's
"necessary study."
The fact that Bartholomew is a novice in the field of affordable housing and
community economic development does not preclude him from using nonlawyers to
assist him. As a licensed lawyer he may still supervise the nonlawyer assistants, subject
to his overarching fiduciary duties and his strategic judgment about the case. This
conclusion follows from the baseline unauthorized-practice dogma described and
explored above.18 2 The dogma assumes a generalized level of competence as a result of
a lawyer's passing the bar.'8 3 The dogma trusts lawyers in ways that it cannot trust
777 P.2d 394, 396 (Okla. 1989) (stating a lawyer cannot pass on learning costs to client).
179. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 2 (2009).
180. Id.
181. This is a necessary assumption for the proceeding analysis, and not an unreasonable
one. Much funding for affordable housing is connected to federal statutory and financing
schemes. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 34, at 19-26; Julianne Kurdila & Elise Rindfleisch,
Funding Opportunitiesfor BrownfieldRedevelopment, 34 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 479,479-
80 (2007); Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Saving Our Cities: What Role Should the Federal Government
Play?, 36 URB. LAw. 475 (2004).
Coletta's expertise in an area exclusively governed by federal law would likely not permit her
to establish an office in a state where she was not licensed, even if she only practiced her federal
work. See Kennedy v. Bar Ass'n of Montgomery County, 561 A.2d 200, 208-10 (Md. 1989)
(holding that a federally admitted lawyer may not establish a Maryland office to practice federal
law); Servidone Constr. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 911 F. Supp. 560, 565-72
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (forbidding attorney admitted by federal court, but not by New York, from
establishing a practice in those federal courts from a New York office, without associating New
York counsel); Charles W. Wolfram, Sneaking Around in the Legal Profession:
Interjurisdictional Unauthorized Practice by Transactional Lawyers, 36 S. TEx. L. REv. 665,
675-76 (1995) (concluding that most authority would not permit an out-of-state lawyer to
establish an office to practice solely federal law). Some authority, though, supports such a
limited federal practice. See Ex parte McCue, 293 P. 47 (Cal. 1930) (attorney moved to
California, established office for practice in the federal district court, no violation of prohibition
on unauthorized practice); AUTHORIZED PRACTICE COMM., supra note 166, at 5 (providing that a
lawyer not licensed in North Carolina may establish an office dedicated to federal practice,
subject to disclosures to prospective clients).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 118-23.
183. See JAMES E. MOLrrERNO, ETHIcs OF THE LAWYER'S WORK 146 (2d ed. 2003); see also
Jeffrey M. Duban, The Bar Exam as a Test of Competence: The Idea Whose Time Never Came,
[Vol. 85:653
SHADOW LA WYERING
nonlawyers, by virtue of their bar admission. Therefore, as a matter of substantive law,
Bartholomew may work with his team of nonlawyers on the MCDC matter, subject to
his professional judgment about the competence of his team to accomplish the work for
which MCDC has retained ELSI. A significant factor in his achieving competence, of
course, is the presence on the team of Dara Coletta.
B. Dara Coletta, the Out-of-State Lawyer
Coletta is a lawyer in California, but in Massachusetts she is a nonlawyer, because
she has not yet taken the Massachusetts Bar Exam. She therefore cannot practice in
Massachusetts.' 84 She is not eligible to practice in her new state under the safe-harbor
provision of Model Rule 5.5(c)(1), which permits out-of-state lawyers to "provide legal
services on a temporary basis.., that (1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer
who is admitted in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter,"',8 5
because under any reasonable interpretation of that provision, Coletta is not practicing
"temporarily" in Massachusetts. 8 6 Any legal services she provides to ELSI clients,
then, are as a nonlawyer under the supervision of Bartholomew.
63 N.Y. ST. B.J., July/August 1991, at 34, 35 (1991) ("[T]he Bar Exam, as a test of 'minimum
competence,' serves to 'protect the public against unqualified lawyers and promote public
confidence in the legal profession."').
184. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2004). For a discussion of out-of-state
lawyers and their practice opportunities, see Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation:
The Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control over Corporate Legal Market, 60 STAN.
L. REv. 1689 (2008); Pamela A. McManus, Have Law License; Will Travel, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 527 (2002).
185. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c)(1) (2004).
186. The term "temporary" receives no definition in the Model Rules, but comment 6 to Rule
5.5 implies a broad scope for the term:
There is no single test to determine whether a lawyer's services are provided on a
"temporary basis" in this jurisdiction, and may therefore be permissible under
paragraph (c). Services may be "temporary" even though the lawyer provides
services in this jurisdiction on a recurring basis, or for an extended period of time,
as when the lawyer is representing a client in a single lengthy negotiation or
litigation.
Id. at R. 5.5 cmt. 6. Despite that broad reading, it seemingly cannot apply to a lawyer who has
made a permanent career change to the new state, and whose work for her clients is permanent
work for a stable, in-state law firm. The example from the comment, a "single lengthy
negotiation," supports that conclusion. The ABA's Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice,
which developed the language in Rule 5.5, interpreted the "temporary" qualifier not to apply to
a lawyer like Coletta. See COMM'N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASsoc.,
CLIENT REPRESENTATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 25 n.36 (2002), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr /mjp/finalmjprpt_l 21702.pdf ("Rule 5.5(c) often will not apply to
an extended residence in a law office in a jurisdiction in which those lawyers are not licensed,
because the intended presence in the jurisdiction will not be 'temporary."'). For an overview of
the multijurisdictional issues leading to the recent amendments to Rule 5.5, see 2 HAzARD &
HODES, supra note 4, § 46.3; Stephen Gillers, Lessons from the Multijurisdictional Practice
Commission: The Art of Making Change, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 685,686 (2002); Carol A. Needham,
Multijurisdictional Practice Regulations Governing Attorneys Conducting a Transactional
Practice, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 1331, 1339.
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The framework developed above, including the refined understanding of the conduit
conception, would lead to the conclusion that Bartholomew possesses the discretion to
delegate to Coletta considerable latitude in performing many of the legal tasks
necessary for MCDC's representation. Under that framework, Bartholomew will
represent MCDC as effectively as he can with the resources available to him, and the
most valuable resource in his "toolkit" would be Coletta. With Bartholomew exercising
his judgment about her effectiveness and retaining responsibility for the final lawyering
product, Coletta may interview constituents of MCDC or other persons with knowledge
about the housing development; draft documents such as affordable housing covenants
and deed restrictions,18 7 deeds, 18  mortgages, and the like; and conduct legal research,
both on the federal law about which she has expertise but also on state and local law
implications. 1
89
Coletta may also meet with constituents of MCDC, who serve as the organizational
client agents for the representation purposes, 190 and explain the law about the
affordable housing projects and development. She may only do so, however, as a
conduit of Bartholomew, as his agent communicating the legal conclusions he is
satisfied are reliable. In the setting described here, where Bartholomew has developed
his competence through Coletta's expertise, 19 the role configurations are delicately
arranged. Because we accept the unauthorized-practice dogma's assertion that Coletta
may not practice law directly, Coletta cannot offer her own independent advice to the
MCDC constituents. To do so would constitute commission of a crime in
Massachusetts, 92 as in every state. 193 But if we accept the refined conception of the
conduit within the framework developed above, Coletta may provide that advice if
Bartholomew employs her nonlawyer services as part of his representation of MCDC.
If Bartholomew's representation is competent because of his team's collective work
under his supervision, and if he assumes full responsibility and liability exposure for
the representation, then Coletta's activities are proper.
187. For a discussion of deed restrictions to ensure the continuation of the affordable quality
of the housing being developed, see SIMON, supra note 34, at 143-60 ("constrained property").
188. See In re Easier, 272 S.E.2d 32, 32-33 (S.C. 1980) (holding that the drafting of deeds
by a nonlawyer is permissible with a lawyer's supervision).
189. We saw above that paralegals often conduct legal research, and the advisory authority
uniformly supports that delegation. See supra text accompanying notes 40-97. If paralegals,
most of whom have not attended law school, may perform legal research as part of a lawyer's
work for a client, it is readily apparent that Coletta, an expert and experienced lawyer in
community economic development, may engage in legal research about that topic in a new
jurisdiction. See Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Hallmon, 681 A.2d 510, 514 (Md. 1996) (noting
the benefits of attorneys delegating supervised work to qualified nonlawyers).
190. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2004) (lawyer represents an
organization through its duly authorized constituents). For a discussion of the occasional
difficulties in discerning which constituents speak for the entity client, see MILTON C. REGAN,
JR. & JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, LEGAL ETHIcs AND CORPORATE PRACTICE 76-96 (2005); William H.
Simon, Whom (or What) Does the Organization's Lawyer Represent?: An Anatomy of
Intraclient Conflict, 91 CAL. L. REv. 57 (2003).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 176-83.
192. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 221, § 46A (LexisNexis 1999) (prohibiting an "individual, other
than a member, in good standing, of the bar of this commonwealth," from practicing law).
193. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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That same analysis would apply to Coletta's negotiation, for instance, with a lender
about the terms of a federal loan package, even if Bartholomew is not present during
the negotiation, 94 as long as the persons with whom she negotiates do not
misunderstand her role or her status. 19 Her signature on documents could bind the law
firm and thus the firm's client. 196 If certain documents require the signature of a lawyer,
then of course Coletta could not sign those papers. And, while the example offered
here is entirely transactional, if a dispute ended up in court, Coletta could not appear
on behalf of MCDC in court absent pro hac vice permission from the court.
197
C. David Dahlstrom and Julie Lucia, the Two Law Students
Recall that Dahlstrom and Lucia are each law students working within the CED
Project, but Dahlstrom is a certified law student under the state's student-practice
rule,198 while Lucia is not. Before we examine what Bartholomew might delegate to a
law student as a generic matter, we need to understand the effect of Dahlstrom's
certification. If Dahlstrom's status as a certified law student makes him effectively a
lawyer, then he and Bartholomew are essentially to be treated the same, and Dahlstrom
would in fact have more authority to practice law in Massachusetts than Coletta
possesses. 199
In fact, in Massachusetts, like many other states,2 00 the student-practice rule has very
unclear applicability to transactional practice, and by its literal terms has unclear
194. We saw above that supervision does not contemplate monitoring or constant
observation, but instead envisions systems and other indicia offering the supervisor reasonable
and reliable assurance that the work will be performed adequately. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 7.05(1) (2006) (stating a principal is liable if oversight systems not in place).
195. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Montalvo, 337 F. Supp. 2d 212, 218-19 (D. Mass. 2004)
(finding that a paralegal's interaction with a client sufficient to trigger former client conflict of
interest); DeVaux v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 444 N.E.2d 355, 359 (Mass. 1983) (stating that
a secretary's actions may have created an attorney-client relationship by the client's reliance);
Developments in the Law-Lawyers'Responsibilities and Lawyers'Responses, 107 HARV. L.
REv. 1547, 1561 (1994).
196. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 cmt. e (2006) (agents may bind principals).
197. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 cmt. c (2002).
198. See MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:03.
199. See In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that a certified law student
is equivalent to a lawyer for purposes of recusal statute); Connecticut Comm. on Prof I Ethics,
Informal Op. 97-10 (1997) (providing that a law clinic student is considered a lawyer for
purposes of conflict-of-interest considerations); Joy, supra note 17, at 832 ("[A] student-lawyer
should be treated as a lawyer for ethics purposes."); Peter A. Joy & Robert B. Kuehn, Conflict of
Interest and Competency Issues in Law Clinic Practice, 9 CLIN. L. REv. 493, 510 (2002)
(reviewing authority treating law students as lawyers).
200. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-5-116.1 (West 2003) (providing that a certified
law student may "appear and participate in any civil proceeding"); N.Y. COMp. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 22, § 805.5 (2008) (referring to civil and criminal court proceedings); ARiz. Sup. CT.
R. 38(d) (providing that a certified law student "may appear in any court or before any
administrative tribunal"); GA. SUP. CT. R. 91 (providing that a certified law student may "assist
in proceedings"); KY. SUP. CT. R. 2.540 (providing that a certified law student may "appear in
any proceeding in any court"). But see ILL. SUP. CT. R. 71 l(c)(1) (stating that a certified law
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applicability to out-of-court legal work by a student representing a client in a litigation
matter. The Massachusetts rule allows a law student working with a legal services
organization, among other settings, 201 to "appear" in court in various contexts on behalf
of indigent clients.20 2 The rule is silent about the proper role of the law student on
behalf of a client apart from the court appearance itself,203 and the rule says nothing at
all about law students representing clients in matters which have no relationship to a
court proceeding, like in transactional community economic-development matters.
204
Given the narrow applicability of the student practice rule, Dahlstrom and Lucia are
situated identically in their status within the ELSI CED Project. (In the litigation units
of ELSI, of course, Dahlstrom would have the status of a licensed lawyer for his
clients.) Dahlstrom and Lucia, while law students, have the same status as any
paralegal in any law office. The "law clerk" status provides them no special rights or
privileges by virtue of that station. In fact, Dahlstrom and Lucia have the same
conceptual status as Mike Newman, the college sophomore who serves as a volunteer
intern for ELSI.
D. Mike Newman, the College Sophomore Intern
Newman has volunteered at ELSI for this academic year. He is a sophomore at
Tufts University, and he is nineteen years old. Unlike all of the other members of the
CED Project team, he has no legal training. He is, however, a nonlawyer assistant, and
Bartholomew possesses discretion to assign to him certain discrete tasks.
This array of third-year law student Dahlstrom, second-year law student Lucia, and
college sophomore Newman presents to Bartholomew an opportunity to understand
contextually his responsibilities as a supervising lawyer using nonlawyers within his
toolkit. The best guidance that the profession and the substantive law can provide to
Bartholomew is that he has discretion to assign to nonlawyers some of the units of
work and activity that he would complete on his own if he had no assistance at all. That
discretion is cabined in critical ways by Bartholomew's judgments about effective risk
management and maintenance of competent practice, as well as the extent of his
client's buy in. It is extremely unlikely that Bartholomew would assign to Newman the
task of drafting an affordable housing covenant, the complex document that, when
recorded, binds future purchasers of the affordable units to maintain the unit's
student "may counsel with clients, negotiate in the settlement of claims, and engage in the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments").
201. Third-year students are within the rule's ambit if they work for the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, a municipality, a public defender office, or a legal aid office. MASS. SUP. JUD.
CT. R. 3:03(1). The rule applies to a second-year student who is enrolled in a law school clinical
program. MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:03(8).
202. MASS. SuP. JUD. CT. R. 3:03. Some settings, such as the state's District Court and the
Probate and Family Court, are covered automatically; other courts, such as the Superior Court
and the courts of appeal, are open to student appearances at the discretion of the judge orjustice
hearing the matter. The rule also does not define indigence.
203. See id. By the clearest of implications, the rule authorizes students who may appear in
court on behalf of an indigent client to engage in all aspects of the practice of law on behalf of
that client outside of the courtroom.
204. Virtually all states' student-practice rules share the narrow litigation focus found in the
Massachusetts rule. But see TENN. SuP. CT. R. 7, § 10.03 (allowing law students to "provide
legal services to... any person or entity financially unable to afford counsel").
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affordable character.2 °5 It is difficult to conceive of that delegation qualifying as an
exercise of wise judgment on Bartholomew's part, given Newman's lack ofexperience
and legal training. Using the same metric, Bartholomew might ask Newman to locate
the legal description of a property from the registry of deeds and then to create a first
draft of a deed for that unit, using the previous deed as a template.
20 6
Bartholomew might assign Dahlstrom, a third-year law student who is licensed to
represent clients in complicated housing litigation, 20 7 to work on the affordable-
housing covenant that Bartholomew would not assign to Newman. Bartholomew might
also assign Dahlstrom to offer advice to the clients, depending on his comfort level
with Dahlstrom's mastery of the material and his judgments about his best
representation of the client.20 8 Again, Dahlstrom would have lawful permission to
205. For a discussion of affordable housing covenants, see, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 33334.3(f)(7) (West 2008) (requiring that certain affordability covenants run with the
land); Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions. Values, and Legal
Enforceability, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEv. L. 35 (2007).
206. See sipra note 188 (citing authority for deed drafting with supervision).
207. Students may represent tenants in contested trials in Massachusetts under the state's
student-practice rule. See Darmetko v. Boston Hous. Auth., 393 N.E.2d 395, 400 (Mass. 1979)
(providing an example of student representation at an eviction trial). Students also conduct
criminal trials while practicing under a student-practice rule. See, e.g., Washington v. Moore,
421 F.3d 660, 662-63 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that a law student "put on the bulk of the defense"
during jury trial); State v. Glenn, 935 P.2d 679, 680-81 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (noting an
instance in which a student conducted trial).
208. Bartholomew has no obligation to offer to his clients the best services with the least risk
exposure. That statement may seem striking, but it must be true or else the use of nonlawyers
would disappear. It is true, by and large, that lawyers will be more competent than nonlawyers,
and that nondelegation would imply less risk for the client than delegation. Lawyers frequently
delegate, though, and delegation is an acceptable component of competent representation. For
clients paying by the billable hour, the answer to the riddle may be quite simple-the client
would choose to save valuable fees if the risk exposure is minimal. But nonlawyer practice also
appears in settings in which the client is not paying by the hour, as in contingency fee contexts
or in fee-for-service representation. See Ashby Jones, More Law Firms Charge Fixed Fees for
Routine Jobs, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2007, at B1 (describing pressure from corporate clients to
limit hourly fees). It simply must be true that lawyers have permission to develop a mix of
resources that together achieve competent service, even if some other efforts might minimally
increase, at great cost, the opportunity for benefit to the client. The standard of care for lawyers
reflects common and ordinary practice, not the best practice possible. See 2 RONALD E. MALLEN
& JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 20.2, at 1306 (2009) (describing the standard of
care for lawyers as relative to lawyers in similar circumstances); see also Wooten v. Heisler, 847
A.2d 1040, 1043 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (stating that malpractice is "the failure to exercise that
degree of skill and leaming commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community by
the average prudent reputable member of the profession"); Wood v. McGrath, North, Mullin &
Kratz, P.C., 589 N.W.2d 103, 108 (Neb. 1999) (stating the competence is determined by
considering "whether the attorney exercised the same skill, knowledge, and diligence as
attorneys of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of all
other legal tasks").
In the setting of free legal services, the clients have less autonomy regarding the allocation of
the firm's resources because of the firm's fiduciary responsibility to spread its finite resources
over many clients. I have examined that phenomenon in the past. See, e.g., Tremblay, supra note
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counsel clients down the hall in ELSI's Housing Unit. Bartholomew could surely
conclude that this talented law student has the capacity to advise the MCDC
constituents about certain aspects of the law as it applies to the organization.
Julie Lucia, as a second-year student who is not a certified law student, falls
somewhere in between Newman and Dahlstrom in her experience. Bartholomew will
use her services in the same contextual way, discerning how she can assist in the
endeavor in a responsible and competent way. She might, after all, show as much
innate skill and talent as the third-year student Dahlstrom, and Bartholomew may use
her in a much more elaborate way.
20 9
CONCLUSION
Lawyers commonly associate with nonlawyers to assist them in their performance of
lawyering tasks. A lawyer cannot know with confidence, though, whether the
delegation of some tasks to a nonlawyer colleague might result in her assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, because the state of the law and the commentary about
nonlawyer practice is so confused and incoherent. Some respected authority within the
profession instructs the lawyer that she may only delegate preparatory matters and must
prohibit the nonlawyer from either discussing legal matters with clients or negotiating
on behalf of clients. Other authority suggests that the lawyer may delegate a wide array
of tasks as long as the lawyer supervises the work of the nonlawyer and accepts
responsibility for it. A good-faith lawyer reviewing the available commentary would
find it difficult to achieve appropriate comfort with her delegation decisions. This
uncertainty affects not only lawyers working with paralegals, but firms hiring out-of-
state lateral associates and partners and law school clinical programs engaged in
transactional work.
This Article has sought to articulate a framework for assessing delegation choices
that is both coherent and sensible, It has shown that any delegation of work by a lawyer
to a nonlawyer involves an exercise of the lawyer's judgment about an appropriate
balance of risk and efficiency, along with an eye toward the client's informed choice
about how to achieve the goals of the representation most efficiently. The prevailing
unauthorized-practice-of-law dogma prevents a client from seeking economical
representation by retaining only a nonlawyer, but that dogma trusts lawyers to protect a
client's interests. With those considerations in place, this Article has concluded that the
profession cannot, and in fact does not, deny the lawyer any categorical options in
making delegation choices, except for those involving public court appearances. Aside
from sending a nonlawyer to court, a lawyer may responsibly delegate any of her
lawyering activities to a nonlawyer associate, subject to the prevailing conceptions of
32; Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level
Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 947,962-63 (1992); Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-
Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1110-14 (1990).
209. Experienced clinical teachers report that second-year law students frequently
demonstrate as much talent and effectiveness as student lawyers as third-year students, and
sometimes more. For some empirical support for that sentiment, see Stefan H. Krieger, The
Effect of Clinical Education on Law Student Reasoning: An Empirical Study, 35 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 359, 366 (2008) (stating that there are only slight differences between second- and
third-year students on certain empirical test measures).
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competent representation and to the lawyer's retaining ultimate responsibility for the
resulting work product and performance.
Some commentary and some court opinions suggest a different answer to the
questions posed here, but those authorities do not withstand careful analysis. This
Article has shown that a more careful reading of the commentary and the court dicta
supports the framework and the thesis offered here. Nonlawyers may not independently
engage in activity which equates to the practice of law, if by "independently" we mean
without supervision and oversight from a lawyer. That important and uncontroversial
limitation, however, along with the duty to provide competent representation, remain
the only categorical restrictions on a lawyer's discretion. A supervised nonlawyer may
play a much more active and important role in a lawyer's overall representation of her
client than many have claimed. For the client, that is a very good result.

